Annalisa Coliva

Professor, Philosophy
School of Humanities

Chair, Philosophy
School of Humanities

Co-Director Medical Humanities Minor
School of Humanities

Ph.D., St Andrews (UK), 2001, Philosophy

Ph.D., Università del Piemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro", Vercelli, Italy, 2001, Philosophy of language

M.A., St Andrews (UK), 1997, Philosophy

A.B., Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy, 1996, Philosophy

Phone: (949) 824-6525

University of California, Irvine
56 Humanities Instructional Building
Mail Code: 4555
Irvine, CA 92697

picture of Annalisa  Coliva

Epistemology, Philosophy of mind and language, History of Analytic Philosophy
Fulbright Research Scholar (2002, Columbia University, NY)
Italian Academy Research Fellow (2004, Columbia University, NY)
Alexander von Humboldt Fellow (2006-7, Heidelberg)
Bogliasco Research Fellow (2007)
Invited Professor at Paris 7-Denis Diderot, Department of History and Philosophy of Science (2009)
Visiting Fellow, Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS, Paris) (2011, 2012)
Chargé de cours, Department of Philosophy, Genève (2013)
O´Brien Distinguished Professorship, Scripps College, California (2014).
Appointments 2010-2016 Associate Professor, Department of Sciences of language and culture, UNIMORE.
2005-2010 Assistant Professor (tenured), Department of Sciences of language and culture, UNIMORE;
2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Sciences of Culture, UNIMORE;
2001-2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg (CH);
2000-2002 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna;
2001-2002 Temporary lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna.
In epistemology, I have developed a form of "hinge epistemology" and I have explored its bearing on scepticism, relativism, testimony, our knowledge of basic logical laws and other basic principles of human inquiry.

In philosophy of mind, I have worked on indexicals, particularly 'I', and demonstratives, on the nature of perceptual content and on the nature of concepts and of intententional mental states.

At the interface between epistemology and the philosophy of mind, I have developed a pluralistic account of self-knowledge.

In history of analytic philosophy my work concerns mostly G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein with special reference to their contributions to epistemology.

Lately, I have developed an interest in various topics in social epistemology and in epistemological issues concerned with medical humanities and digital media.
Publications Monographs

(1) (with M. Baghramian) Relativism, Routledge, forthcoming.
(2) The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London, Palgrave, 2016
(3) Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. London, Palgrave, 2015
(4) Scetticismo. Dubbio, paradosso, conoscenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2012.
(5) Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, London, Palgrave, 2010.
(6) I modi del relativismo, Laterza, Roma, 2009.
(7) (with E. Lalumera) Pensare. Leggi ed errori del ragionamento, Carocci, Roma, 2006/1, 2014/4.
(8) I concetti. Teorie ed esercizi, Carocci, Roma, 2004/1, 2007/2.
(9) Moore e Wittgenstein: scetticismo, certezza e senso comune, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003.
(10) (with E. Sacchi) Singular Thoughts. Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts and I-Thoughts, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2001.

Edited Books

(1) (with N. Pedersen) Epistemic Pluralism, Palgrave, forthcoming.
(2) (with P. Leonardi) Language, Language, Language. Essays in Honor of Eva Picardi, London, Palgrave, forthcoming.
(3) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock) Hinge Epistemology, Brill, 2016.
(4) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock and V. Munz) Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015.
(5) (with C. Calabi, A. Sereni & G. Volpe) Teorie della conoscenza. Il dibattito contemporaneo, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2015.
(6) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(7) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(8) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007.
(9) (with E. Picardi) Wittgenstein Today, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004.
  Papers, Book Chapters, Reviews, Encyclopedic Entries

(1) "Disagreeing with myself. Doxastic commitments, Moore's paradox and belief revision", American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.
(2) "Practical knowledge and linguistic competence", in A. Coliva and P. Leonardi (eds.) Language, Language and Language. Essays in Honor of Eva Picardi, London, Palgrave, forthcoming.
(3) “Moore and Mooreanism”, in B. Reed and D. Machuca (eds.), Scepticism. From Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, forthcoming.
(4) “Précis of Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, forthcoming.
(5) “Replies to commentators”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, forthcoming.
(6) “Against Wittgensteinian entitlements”, in N. Jang Lee Ling Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
(7) “Anti-scientism. Wittgenstein philosopher of culture”, in J. Beale and I. J. Kid (eds.) Wittgenstein and Scientism, Routledge, forthcoming.
(8) “Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature”, in T. Raleigh and K. Cahill (eds.) Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Routledge, forthcoming.
(9) (with D. Belleri) “Gettier and context”, in S. Hetherington (ed.) Gettier and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
(10) “Self-knowing interpreters”, in J. Kirsch and P. Pedrini (eds.) Third Person Self-Knowledge, Interpretation and Narrative, Springer, forthcoming.
(11) “How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge”, in A. Coliva and N. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, Palgrave, forthcoming.
(12) “Stopping points: I, immunity and the real guarantee”, Inquiry, On-line first, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1261999.
(13) “Which hinge epistemology?”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 6, 2016, pp. 79-96.
(14) “Review of Duncan Pritchard Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton UP, 2016”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016,
(15) “Io: un indicale essenziale?”, Iride, 2016, pp. 341-346.
(16) “How to perceive reasons”, Episteme 13/1, 2016, pp. 77-88.
(17) “How to commit Moore’s paradox”, The Journal of Philosophy, CXII, 4, 2015, pp. 169-192.
(18) "Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein", in A. Contini, E. Moietta, A. Ramploud (eds.) Metamorfosi delle differenze, Roma, Aracne, 2015, pp. 119-147.
(19) “Wittgenstein. Quattro temi dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer”, in D. Generali (ed.) Le radici della razionalità critica: saperi, pratiche, teleologie. Saggi in onore di Fabio Minazzi, Udine, Mimesis, 2015, pp. 86-105.
(20) “Review of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans, OUP, 2014”, Analysis, 2015: doi: 10.1093/analysis7anv078
(21) “Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean skepticism”, in D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 248-272.
(22) (with S. Moruzzi) “Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism”, Iride, XXVI/73, 2014, pp.537-554.
(23) (with S. Moruzzi) “Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox”, in F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell´Utri (eds.) New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 38-62.
(24) (with M. C. Amoretti) “Epistemology”, in T. Andina (ed.) Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide. A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy - Brill Leiden-Boston, 2014, pp. 38-64.
(25) “Review of Julia Tanney, Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2013”, Analysis, 74, 2014, pp. 353-355.
(26) (with A. Sereni) “Crispin Wright”, Profili, Aphex, Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 2014,
(27) “Self-knowledge”. SAGE Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. by Hal Pashler, 2013.
(28) “Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense”, Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013, pp. 1-12.
(29) “Replies“,Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013, pp. 81-96.
(30) “Scepticism and knowledge”, M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 975-1002.
(31) (with D. Belleri) “Some observations on François Recanati's Mental Files”, Disputatio 5/36, 2013, pp. 1-11.
(32) “Sulle origini dell'oggettività”, Iride, 68, 2013, pp. 183-189.
(33) “Dal senso ai sensi... e ritorno”, E/C VII/17, 2013, pp. 63-67.
(34) “Review of Jordi Fernandez, Transparent Minds, OUP 2013”, Theoria, 81, 2014, pp. 442-445.
(35) “Review of G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, CUP, 2013”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.06.33,
(36) “Review of N. Vassallo, Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza, Feltrinelli, 2011”, Iride XXVI/70, 2013, pp. 670-672.
(37) (with M. Palmira) “Relativismo e multiculturalismo”, in C. Baraldi (ed.) Gli invisibili. La condizione degli immigrati nella società, Bonanno, Roma, 2012, pp. 19-39.
(38) (with S. Moruzzi) "Truth-relativists can’t trump moral progress", Analytic Philosophy, 53/1, 2012, pp. 47-56.
(39) (with C. Amoretti) “Epistemologia (o della conoscenza)”, in T. Andina (ed.) Filosofia contemporanea. Uno sguardo globale, Roma, Carocci, 2012, pp. 59-91.
(40) “Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission--what else?!), Synthese, 189/2, 2012, pp. 235-254.
(41) “Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives—is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP, 2012, pp. 323-351.
(42) “Percepire le ragioni?”, Iride, 65, 2012, pp. 119-132.
(43) “Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing as”, Synthese, 186/1, 2012, pp. 121-148.
(44) “One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism”, A. Coliva (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 212-242.
(45) “Which key to all mythologies about the self?”, F. Recanati and S. Prosser (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 22-45.
(46) “Critical notice of Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity”, Disputatio, 4/33, 2012, pp. 515-530.
(47) (with M. Palmira) “Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein”, in R. Davies (ed.) Analisi, Milano, Mimesis, 2011, pp. 291-304.
(48) “Wittgenstein out of context”, in C. Jaeger, W. Loeffler (eds.) Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 7-13 2011, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 50-51.
(49) “Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?”, Philosophical Investigations 33/1, 2010, pp. 1-23.
(50) “Moore's Proof and Martin Davies' epistemic projects”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1, 2010, pp. 101-116.
(51) “Sull'idea stessa di relativismo”, in V. Villa (ed.) Relativismo: temi e prospettive, Roma, Aracne, 2010, pp. 155-175.
(52) “La verità di Rorty, tra Vattimo e Marconi”, M. Carrara e V. Morato (eds.) Verità, Udine-Milano, Mimesis, 2010, pp. 261-270.
(53) “Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and ‘la corruttela’”, Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 38/1, 2010, pp. 29-39.
(54) (with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock) Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographies On-line, 2010,
(55) “Self-knowledge and commitments”, Synthese, 171/3, 2009, pp. 365-375.
(56) “Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo?”, in Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Rappresentazione, percezione e coscienza, ETS, Pisa, 2009, pp. 95-113.
(57) “What kind of entities are concepts?”, in D. Gambarara, A. Givigliano (eds.) Origine e sviluppo del linguaggio, fra teoria e storia. Atti del XV Convegno della Società di filosofia del linguaggio, Aracne editrice, Roma, 2009, pp. 211-219.
(58) “The paradox of Moore’s Proof of an external world”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 2008, pp. 234-243.
(59) “Tu chiamale se vuoi ‘emozioni’”, in F. Cimatti (a cura di), Linguaggio ed emozioni, Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università della Calabria, 24, 2009, pp. 71-85.
(60) “Peacocke’s self-knowledge”, Ratio, XXI/1, 2008, pp. 13-27.
(61) “Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?”, in F. Giuliani e M. Barni (eds.) Il logos nella polis. La diversità delle lingue e delle culture, le nostre identità. Atti del XIV Convegno della Società di Filosofia del linguaggio, Roma, Aracne, 2008, pp. 439-452.
(62) “Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico”, Jura Gentium, IV, 2008.
(63) “Review of A. Paternoster, Il filosofo e i sensi, Carocci, 2007”, Il Protagora, 12, 2008, pp. 552-554.
(64) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007, pp. 255-280.
(65) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in M. De Caro, E. Spinelli (eds.) Lo scetticismo antico e contemporaneo, Carocci, Roma, 2007, pp. 186-210. (Abridged version of 58).
(66) “La filosofia analitica”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 398-412.
(67) “Wittgenstein”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 419-432.
(68) “Linguaggio e filosofia”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 442-452.
(69) “Review of Lalumera, E. Normatività e concetti, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004”, 2R, 6, 2007, pp. 12-19.
(70) “Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore”, Epistemologia, 29/1, 2006, pp. 61-78.
(71) “Error through misidentification: some varieties”, The Journal of Philosophy, CIII/8, 2006, pp. 403-425.
(72) “Self-Knowledge. One More Constitutive View”, Preprints Dipartimento di Filosofia, 28, 2006, pp. 101-121.
(73) “Moore’s paradox and commitments. On this very complicated concept of belief”, in P. Leonardi (ed.) Facets of concepts, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2005, pp. 233-252.
(74) “Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor”, in A. Coliva and E. Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004, pp. 411-429.
(75) “Review of Vignolo, M. Afferrare pensieri, Carocci, Roma 2001”, Epistemologia, 2004, pp. 356-359.
(76) “Moore’s Proof of an external world. Just begging the question”, in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner (eds.) Proceedings Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg XI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003, pp. 91-96.
(77) “Error through misidentification, the split between semantic and speaker’s reference and the real guarantee”, The Journal of Philosophy, C/8, 2003, pp. 416-431.
(78) “Io pensieri e metafisica dell’io: ovvero dell’anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e analitica”, in M. Carrara, G. De Anna, S. Magrin (eds.) Saggi di filosofia del linguaggio, filosofia della mente e metafisica, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003, pp. 193-213.
(79) “The Problem of the Finer-Grained Content of Experience. A Redefinition of its Role within the Debate between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003, pp. 57-70.
(80) “Review of Paternoster, A. Linguaggio e visione, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2001”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003, pp. 97-99.
(81) “In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione”, in P. Parrini (a cura di) Conoscenza e cognizione, Guerini, Milano, 2002, pp. 147-161.
(82) “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002, pp. 27-34.
(83) “On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought. A Reply to John Campbell”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002, pp. 41-46.
(84) “Wright and McDowell on the Content of Perception and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs”, Lingua e Stile, 36/1, 2001, pp. 3-23.
(85) “Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Uses of ‘I’ as Subject and as Object at the Origin of the No-Subject View about the Self and its Solution”, in Berit Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality Pre-proceedings of the 24th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2000, pp. 117-122.
(86) “Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo”, in D. Marconi (ed.) Naturalismo e naturalizzazione, Mercurio edizioni, Vercelli, 1999, pp. 169-187.
(87) “Review of Bermúdez, J. L. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, MIT, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 582-586.
(88) “Review of Cassam, Q. Self and World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp.654-656.
(89) “Review of Wright, C., Smith, B. C., Macdonald, C., (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 586-589.
(90) “Review of McDowell, J. Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)- London, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 652-654.
(91) “Review of Dionigi, R. La fatica di descrivere. Itinerario di Wittgenstein nel linguaggio della filosofia, Vallecchi editore, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1998, 33, pp. 669-676.
(92) “Moore: scetticismo e senso comune”, Lingua e Stile, 32/2, 1997, pp. 167-188.
(93) “Review of Bruschwig, J., Nussbaum, M. 1996 (eds.) Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge, CUP”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 655-656.
(94) “Review of Kim, J. 1996 Philosophy of Mind, Boulder (Colorado) - Oxford, Westview Press”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 608-611.
(95) “Review of McGinn, M. 1997 Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London and New York, Routledge”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 583-588.
(96) “Review of Stroll, A. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 588-595.
(97) “Review of Haldane, J., Wright, C. (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection, New York-Oxford, OUP, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 665-666.
(98) “Review of Williams, M. (ed.), Scepticism, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 663-664.
Grants Humanities Commons Grant for collaborative conference 2017
UCHRI Grant for Collaborative conference 2017
Medical Humanities UCI, Curriculum Development Grant 2017
PRIN 2010-2011 "Realismo e oggettività" (period of the grant: 2013-2016). PI of the Research Unit based at UNIMORE.
Grant for "Incentivazione dell´offerta formativa in lingua inglese", Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia (2012, 2013, 2014).
Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship Grant (2006-7, Heidelberg)
Italian Academy Research Fellowship Grant (2004, Columbia University, NY)
Fulbright Research Scholarship Grant (2002, Columbia University, NY)
Italian Government grant for a PhD (1997-2001); Top-up Award, University of St. Andrews (1998, 1999, 2000); SAAS (Scottish Academy Awards) grant for the M. Litt (1997); ERASMUS grant (St. Andrews) (2005-6).
SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy)
SFL (Società di Filosofia del linguaggio)
EEN (European Epistemology Network)
ESAP European Society for Analytic Philosophy
APA (American Philosophical Association)
Other Experience Member of the Editorial Board
Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Sképsis, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Thought, Disputatio, Iride, Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio, Philosophical Inquiries, Rivista italiana filosofia analitica jr, INKOJ-- Philosophy & Artificial Languages, I castelli di Yale, Al-Mukhatabat Journal

Research Centers Deputy Director, Cogito Research Centre in Philosophy, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy
Co-Director, Cogito-Mo, UNIMORE, Italy
Link to this profile
Last updated 09/15/2017