Duncan Pritchard

Picture of Duncan Pritchard
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
School of Humanities
Ph.D., University of St. Andrews, 2000, Philosophy
University of California, Irvine
85 Humanities Instructional Building
Mail Code: 4555
Irvine, CA 92697
Research Interests
Epistemology; Skepticism; Wittgenstein; Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Education; Philosophy of Law
Academic Distinctions
Professor Pritchard's academic distinctions include the Philip Leverhulme Prize in Philosophy (2007), being elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (2011), and delivering the Annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy (2013).
Professor Pritchard has held Chairs in Philosophy at the Universities of Edinburgh and Stirling, Scotland. He has also held visiting positions at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, Macquarie University, the University of Helskinki, and Aarhus University, Denmark.
Research Abstract
Professor Pritchard's research is mainly in the area of epistemology, and he has published broadly in this field. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, Oxford UP, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012), Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton UP, 2015), and Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford UP, 2019). His most recent book is Scepticism (with A. Coliva, Routledge, 2022). He is the Director of the Center for Knowledge, Technology & Society. He is also Director of the campus-wide curriculum project, The Anteater Virtues.

• Tempting Fate: Risk, Luck and the Meaning of Life, (Princeton UP, under contract).
• Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty (with D. Moyal-Sharrock), (Cambridge UP, under contract).
• Scepticism (with A. Coliva), (Routledge, 2022).
• Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford UP, 2019). [Translated into Greek, Japanese & Portuguese].
• Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, (Princeton UP, 2015).
• Epistemological Disjunctivism, (Oxford UP, h/bk 2012; p/bk 2014).
• The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, h/bk 2010; p/bk 2012).
• Epistemic Luck, (Oxford UP, h/bk 2005; p/bk 2007).


• What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 1st ed. 2006; 2nd ed. 2009; 3rd ed. 2013; 4th ed. 2018; 5th ed. 2023). [Translated into Arabic, Turkish, Japanese, Hindi & Kannada].
• Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (with M. Harris), (Routledge, 2017).
• Epistemology, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
• What is This Thing Called Philosophy?, (Routledge, 2015; 2nd ed. forthcoming).
• Philosophy for Everyone (with M. Chrisman), (Routledge, 2013; 2nd ed. 2016). [Translated into Chinese, Turkish, Portuguese & Spanish].
• Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed. 2009; 2nd ed. 2016).
• Epistemology A-Z (with M. Blaauw), (Edinburgh UP/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).


• Brill Studies on Skepticism (with D. Machuca), (Brill, from 2013).
• Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, from 2012).
• New Waves in Philosophy (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, from 2007).


• Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, (Oxford UP, from 2010).
• International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (with D. Machuca), (Brill, from 2011).


• Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives, (with M. Farina & A. Lavazza), (Oxford UP, in preparation).
• New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, (with M. Jope), (Routledge, 2022).
• New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (with C. Doyle & J. Milburn), (Routledge, 2019).
• Extended Epistemology, (with A. Clark, J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), (Oxford UP, 2018).
• Socially Extended Epistemology, (with A. Clark, J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), (Oxford UP, 2018).
• The Philosophy of Luck (with L. Whittington), (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).
• Social Epistemology: Five Questions, (with V. F. Hendricks), (Automatic Press, 2015).
• The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (with S. Bernecker), (Routledge, 2010).
• Social Epistemology (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, 2010).
• Epistemic Value (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, 2009).
• Williamson on Knowledge (with P. Greenough), (Oxford UP, 2009).
• Arguing About Knowledge (with R. Neta), (Routledge, 2008).
• Epistemology: Five Questions (with V. F. Hendricks), (Automatic Press, 2008).
• New Waves in Epistemology (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
• Moral and Epistemic Virtue (with M. S. Brady), (Blackwell, 2003).


• Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives (with J. Adam Carter, C. Mi & S. O. Palermos), Synthese (2020).
• Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), American Philosophical Quarterly (2016).
• Intellectual Humility (with J. A. Carter & J. Kallestrup), Logos & Episteme (2016).
• The Philosophy of Luck (with L. Whittington), Metaphilosophy 45 (2014).
• Extended Knowledge (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014).
• Extended Cognition and Epistemic Action (with A. Clark & K. Vaesen), Philosophical Explorations 15 (2012).
• Cognitive Ecology: The Role of the Concept of Knowledge in our Social Cognitive Ecology (with M. Gerken, J. Kallestrup & K. Kappel), Episteme 8 (2011).
• The Philosophy of Crispin Wright (with J. Kallestrup), Synthese 171 (2009).
• Epistemic Luck, special issue of Synthese 158 (2007).
• Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology (with M. S. Brady), Philosophical Studies 116 (2006).
• Epistemological Contextualism (with M. S. Brady), Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005).
• Virtues: Moral and Epistemic (with M. S. Brady), Metaphilosophy 34 (2003).


• ‘Religious Vertigo’, Religionsphilosophie nach Wittgenstein (Philosophy of Religion after Wittgenstein), (ed.) E. Ramharter, (Stuttgart, Germany: Metzler/Springer, forthcoming).
• ‘Understanding Deep Disagreement’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, (forthcoming). [To be translated into Spanish for Deep Disagreement, (ed.) G. Arroyo, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones UNGS)].
• ‘Hypocritical Experts’, Overcoming the Myth of Neutrality: Expertise for a New World, (eds.) M. Farina & A. Lavazza, (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Public Expertise and Ignorance’, Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives, (eds.) M. Farina, A. Lavazza & D. H. Pritchard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
• ‘Pyrrhonism and Wittgensteinian Quietism’, Ancient Scepticism and Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) L. Perissinotto & B. R. Cámara, (Milan, Italy: Mimesis International, forthcoming).
• ‘Extended Social Epistemology’, Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, (eds.) J. Lackey & A. McGlynn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
• ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (ed.) J. Dutant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
• ‘Deep Disagreement’, Routledge Handbook to Philosophy of Disagreement, (eds.) M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter & R. Rowland (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Evidence’, Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, (eds.) M. Lasonen-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn, (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’ & ‘Reply to Hetherington’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (3rd Edn.), (eds.) B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).
• ‘The Epistemic Goals of Education’, prepared as part of the educational resource, Philosophy of Education for Teachers, (ed.) J. De Souza, for the organization Parents and Teachers for Excellence.

• ‘Moderate Knowledge Externalism’, Externalism About Knowledge, (ed.) L R. G. Oliveira, 131-49, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
• ‘Truth as a Fundamental Value’, Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (eds.) P. Gori & L. Serini, 8-23, (London: Routledge, 2023).
• ‘Epistemic Virtue in Higher Education: Testing the Mechanisms of Intellectual Character Development’ (with G. A. Orona, R. Arum, J. Eccles, Q.-V. Dang, D. Copp, D. Herrmann, B. Rushing & S. Zitzmann), Current Psychology (2023), [DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-05005-1].
• ‘Knowledge From Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge, (eds.) R. Borges & I. Schnee, ch. 6, (London: Routledge, 2023).
• ‘Extended Knowledge and Autonomous Belief’, Inquiry (2023), [DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238291].
• ‘Educating for Virtuous Intellectual Character and Valuing Truth’, Philosophies (invited for special issue on ‘Between Virtue and Epistemology’, (ed.) G. Schonbaumsfeld), 8, 29 (2023), [DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020029].
• ‘Skepticism, Fideism, and Religious Epistemology’, Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, (eds.) J. Fuqua, J. Greco & T. McNabb, 83-95, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).
• ‘Critical Notice of Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains, by Ernest Sosa (OUP, 2021)’, Philosophical Review (2023).

• ‘Exploring Quasi-Fideism’, Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis, ch. 2, (London: Anthem, 2022).
• ‘In Defence of the Modal Account of Legal Risk’, Synthese [special issue on ‘Evidence in Law and Ethics’, (eds.) A. Dyrda & T. Zuradzki], (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03693-z].
• ‘Socially Extended Scientific Knowledge’, Frontiers in Psychology [special issue on ‘Distributed and Embodied Cognition in Scientific Contexts’, (eds.) M. D Beni, A. Pietarinen & M. Farina], (2022), [DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.894738].
• ‘Scepticism and Commonsense’, Analysis 82 (2022), 716-25.
• ‘Hinge Commitments and Common Knowledge’, Synthese [special issue on ‘Greco’s Epistemology’, (eds.) N. Venturhina], 200 (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03647-5].
• ‘Intellectual Virtue and Its Role in Epistemology’, Asian Journal of Philosophy [invited keynote essay as part of a special issue devoted to my work], 1 (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s44204-022-00024-4].
• ‘Virtuous Arguing With Conviction and Humility’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2022), [DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10328-2].
• ‘Quasi-Fideism and Epistemic Relativism’, Inquiry (2022), [DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2135820].
• ‘Putnam on Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion-Sensitive Semantics’, Engaging Putnam, (eds.) J. Conant & S. Chakraborty, 263-88, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022).
• ‘Factive Reasons and Propositional Justification’, Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance, (eds) L. Oliveira & P. Silva, 79-98, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘Extended Ignorance’, Embodied, Extended, Ignorant Minds: New Studies on the Nature of Not-Knowing, (eds.) S. Arfini & L. Magnani, ch. 4, (Dordrecht, Holland: Springer, 2022).
• ‘Cultivating Intellectual Virtues’, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Education, (ed.) R. Curren, ch. 11, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue’ (with M. Croce), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 583-601, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘On Solidarity: Collectivity, Trust, and Deference’ (response to Heather Battaly’s ‘Solidarity: Virtue or Vice?’), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 329-31, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘Virtue Responsibilism, Mindware, and Education’ (with M. Croce; response to Steven Bland’s ‘Interactionism, Debiasing, and the Division of Epistemic Labour’), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 42-44, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘Response to Commentaries by Alessandra Tanesini and Lani Watson’ (with M. Croce), Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, 609-12, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘In Defence of Closure’, New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, (eds.) M. Jope & D. H. Pritchard, (London: Routledge, 2022).
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (updated, with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta; [available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/].

• ‘Ignorance and Inquiry’, American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2021), 111-23. [Translated into Tunisian by Oussama Slim for MAANA].
• ‘Extended Cognition, Assistive Technology and Education’, (with A. English & J. Ravenscroft), Synthese (2021), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03166-9.
• ‘Inculcating Curiosity: Pilot Results of an Online Module to Enhance Undergraduate Intellectual Virtue’ (with G. A. Orona), Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education (2021), DOI: 10.1080/02602938.2021.1919988.
• ‘Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo’, Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2021), 7-22.
• ‘Philosophy in Prison and the Cultivation of Intellectual Character’, Journal of Prison Education and Reentry 7 (2021), 130-43.
• ‘Truth, Inquiry, Doubt’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45 (2021), 505-24, DOI: 10.5840/msp202110611.
• ‘Ignorance and Normativity’, Philosophical Topics 49 (2021), 225-43.
• ‘Against the Odds: The Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care’ (with J. Helmreich), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials, (eds.) Z. Hoskins & J. Robson, ch. 9, (Routledge, 2021).
• ‘Good News, Bad News, Fake News’, Epistemology of Fake News, (eds.) S. Bernecker, A. Flowerre & T. Grundman, 46-67, (Oxford UP, 2021).
• ‘Assurance and Disjunctivism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (symposium on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity, (Oxford University Press, 2018)), 102 (2021), 715-20.
• ‘Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Commonsense and Philosophy’, Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy, (eds.) R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, 247-64, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
• ‘Veritism and the Goal of Inquiry’, Philosophia 49 (2021), 1347-59.
• ‘Sceptical Fideism and Quasi-Fideism’, Manuscrito 44 (2021), 1-21.
• ‘Omniscience and Ignorance’, Veritas 66 (2021).
• ‘Varieties of Epistemic Risk’, Acta Analytica (2021), DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00489-7.
• ‘In Defence of Veritism’ & ‘In Defence of Veritism: Responses to My Critics’, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science [invited lead article for symposium with commentators: Sergei Levin, John Greco, Shane Ryan & Ernest Sosa], 58 (2021), 22-37 & 68-77.
• 'Veritic Desire’, Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (2021), 1-21.
• ‘Skeptical Invariantism and the Source of Skepticism’, Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered (eds.) C. Kyriacou & K. Wallbridge, ch. 2, (London: Routledge, 2021).
• ‘On Hinge Epistemology’, Skepsis 23 (2021), 1-17. [Invited submission; and to be translated into Portuguese in Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) M. N. Figueiredo & P. Smith, (São Paulo, Brazil: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia)].
• ‘Socrates as Intellectual Character Builder’ (with A. Kotsonis, I. Lytra & T. Scaltsas), Dialogoi: Ancient Philosophy Today [invited contribution] 3 (2021), 133-47.

• ‘Educating For Ignorance’ (with R. Peels), Synthese (special issue on ‘Knowing the Unknown: Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance’, (eds.) S. Arfini & L. Magnani), [Online First (2020), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02544-z].
• ‘Epistemic Vertigo’, The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds, (eds.) B. Brogaard & D. Gatzia, ch. 7, (Routledge, 2020).
• ‘Educating For Intellectual Humility and Conviction’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2020), 398-409; and to be reprinted in Teaching and Learning: Epistemic, Metaphysical and Ethical Dimensions, (ed.) D. Bakhurst, (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• ‘Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, (eds.) J. Greco & C. Kelp, 203-24, (Cambridge UP, 2020).
• ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment’, Synthese, [Online First (2020), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02703-2].
• ‘Extended Cognition and Humility’, Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, ch. 39, (Routledge, 2020).
• ‘Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, (eds.) C. Pavese & E. Fridland, 135-45, (Routledge, 2020).
• ‘Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, 42-51, (Routledge, 2020).

• ‘Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Empirical Study’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Shepherd), Review of Philosophy and Psychology [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9].
• ‘The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement’ (with J. A. Carter), Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 44 (2019), 220-42.
• ‘Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux’, Synthese (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing), (2019), [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02504-2].
• ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’, Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, (eds.) J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt, 172-92, (Oxford UP, 2019).
• ‘Philosophy in Prisons: Intellectual Virtue and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Teaching Philosophy [Online First (2019), DOI: 10.5840/teachphil201985108].
• ‘Intellectual Virtues and the Epistemic Value of Truth’, Synthese [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z; Translated into Tunisian by Oussama Slim for MAANA].
• ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action’, Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, (eds.) N. de Costa & S. Wuppuluri, 91-106, (Springer, 2019).
• ‘Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism’, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, (ed.) M. Kusch, 292-300, (London: Routledge, 2019).
• ‘Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection’, Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, (ed.) W. Da Silva Filho, ch. 5, (Springer, 2019).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief’, Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, (eds.) P. Bondy & J. A. Carter, 235-50, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘Scepticism and Atheism’, A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, (ed.) G. Oppy, 277-90, (Blackwell, 2019).
• ‘Modal Accounts of Luck’, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, (eds.) I. Church & R. Hartman, ch. 10, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘Extended Self-Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, (eds.) J. E. Kirsch & P. Pedrini, 31-49, (Springer, 2019).
• ‘Extended Entitlement’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Entitlement, (eds.) P. Graham & N. Pedersen, 223-39, (Oxford UP, 2019).
• ‘Contemporary Responses to Radical Scepticism’, Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945 to 2015, (eds.)
K. Becker & I. Thomson, ch. 8, (Cambridge UP, 2019).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) H. Battaly, ch. 23, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History—Vol IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) S. Hetherington & M. Valaris, ch. 11, (Bloomsbury, 2019).
• ‘Précis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Skepsis (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing), 10 (2019), 47-54 & 83-93.
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (eds.) C. Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, 41-58, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo’, (symposium on Venturinha’s Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology), Philosophia. [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00138-9].

• ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018), 70-90. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas].
• ‘Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement’, Synthese. [Online First (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5]
• ‘Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement’, TOPOI. [Online First (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y]
• ‘Unnatural Doubts’, Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, (eds.) G. A. Bruno & A. Rutherford, 223-47, (Routledge 2018).
• ‘Extended Virtue Epistemology’, Inquiry 61 (2018), 632-47.
• ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence 9 (2018), 108-19. [To be reprinted in Law and Virtues, (eds.) A. Amaya & C. Michelon, (Routledge, forthcoming)].
• ‘Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education’, Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), 328-49; and to be reprinted in Connecting Virtues: Theoretical and Educational Insights, (eds.) M. Croce & M. S. Vaccarezza, (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2018), 51-66.
• ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, (ed.) C. Johnson, 22-39, (Routledge, 2018).
• ‘Extended Knowledge’, Extended Epistemology, (eds.) J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & D. H. Pritchard, 90-104, (Oxford UP, 2018).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism’, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, (ed.) V. Mitova, 15-31, (Cambridge UP, 2018). [Translated into Portugese by E. Carvalho, and published in Sképsis].
• ‘The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck’, The Gettier Problem, (ed.) S. Hetherington, 96-107, (Cambridge UP, 2018).
• ‘Precis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemic Angst with R. Borges, M. Veder & C. Salvatore), 41 (2018), 115-65.
• ‘Aesthetic Risk’, Think 17 (2018), 1-14.
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2018); [available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/].

• ‘Anti-Risk Epistemology and Negative Epistemic Dependence’, Synthese. [Online First (2017), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6]
• ‘Faith and Reason’, Philosophy (invited special issue on Religious Epistemology), 81 (2017), 101-18.
• ‘Epistemically Useful False Beliefs’, Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017), 4-20.
• ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’ (with C. Ranalli), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, 652-67, (Bloomsbury, 2017).
• ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity’ (with J. A. Carter), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, (eds.) K. McCain & T. Poston, 133-48, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge-First Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge-First Epistemology, (eds.) J. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, 200-22, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, (eds.) H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 563-75, (Blackwell, 2017).
• ‘Knowledge, Luck and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem’, Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on The Gettier Problem, (eds.) C. Almeida, P. Klein & R. Borges, 57-73, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Situationism, (eds.) M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168-91, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding’ (with J. A. Carter), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, (eds.) S. Ammon, C. Baumberger, C. Beisbart, G. Brun & S. Grimm, 272-92, (Routledge, 2017).
• ‘Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value’, Synthese 194 (2017), 1477–86.
• ‘Intellectual Pride and Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pride, (eds.) J. A. Carter & E. Gordon, 69-78, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
• ‘Is There a Fundamental Tension Between Faith and Rationality?’, Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 53-61, (Routledge, 2017).
• ‘How Do Scientific Claims Relate to the Truth?’ (with S. O Palermos), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 4-15, (Routledge, 2017).

• ‘Epistemic Risk’, Journal of Philosophy 113 (2016), 550-71.
• ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2016), DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12280. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas].
• ‘Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 969-90.
• ‘Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy’, Episteme 13 (2016), 29-42.
• ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016), 1-20.
• ‘Contextualism and Radical Scepticism’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0.
• ‘Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification’ (with P. Bondy), Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2.
• ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4.
• ‘Epistemic Axiology’, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, (eds.) M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig, 407-22, (DeGruyter, 2016).
• ‘The Distribution of Epistemic Agency’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency, (ed.) P. Reider, 109-26, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
• ‘From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Res Philosophica 93 (2016), 533-52.
• ‘Ignorance and Epistemic Value’, The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, (eds.) M. Blaauw & R. Peels, 132-43, (Cambridge UP, 2016).
• ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Baehr, 113-27, (Routledge, 2016).
• ‘Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, (ed.) M. Fernandez, 31-50, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘Radical Scepticism and Brains in Vats’ (with C. Ranalli), The Brain in a Vat, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 75-89, (Cambridge UP, 2016).
• ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement’ (with J. A. Carter), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue, (eds.) M. Slote, E. Sosa & C. Mi, 49-63, (Routledge, 2016).
• ‘The Sources of Scepticism’, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (invited special issue on Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein), 6 (2016), 203-27.
• ‘Veritism and Epistemic Value’, Alvin Goldman and His Critics, (eds.) H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin, 200-18, (Blackwell, 2016).
• ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue’, Zi Ran Bian Zheng Fa Tong Xun [Journal of Dialectics of Nature] (commissioned), (2016).

• ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 93-111.
• ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), 436-61.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck’ (with J. A. Carter), Noûs 49 (2015), 440-53.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015), 181-99.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value’ (with J. A. Carter), Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2015), 799-816.
• ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Responses to My Critics’, Analysis (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism), 75 (2015), 589-95 & 627-37.
• ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman’, God, Truth and Other Enigmas, (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, (Walter de Gruyter, 2015).
• ‘Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie’, Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, 153-78, (Mentis, 2015).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’ (with J. Kallestrup), European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), 335-57.
• ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45 (2014), 594-619; and reprinted in The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, 143-68, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).

• ‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 63-109.
• ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, (Springer, 2014).
• ‘Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion’, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, (eds.) C. Littlejohn & J. Turri, 155-72, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Sceptical Intuitions’, Intuitions, (eds.) D. Rowbottom & T. Booth, 213-31, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini, 190-213, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good’, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, (eds.) J. Matheson & R. Vitz, 112-29, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Re-evaluating the Epistemic Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology’, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, (eds.) A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, 143-54, (Cambridge UP, 2014).
• ‘What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview’, (with M. Massimi), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, (ed.) M. Massimi, 1-13, (Routledge, 2014).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture (invited submission), 478 (2014), 47-66.
• ‘Zagzebski on Rationality’ (with S. Ryan), European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 39-46.

• ‘The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, (eds.) J. Greco & R. Groff, ch. 13, (Routledge, 2013).
• ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, (eds.) T. Henning & D. Schweikard, 209-226, (Routledge, 2013).
• ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2013), 236-47; reprinted in Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives From Social and Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) B. Kotzee, 92-105, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology (2013).
• ‘Davidson on Radical Skepticism’, Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, 521-33, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Ed.), (eds.) M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, 152-64, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Humanities (invited submission for special issue on Richard Rorty), 2 (2013), 351-68.
• ‘Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Value’ (invited submission), Philosophical Inquiries 1 (2013), 1-37.
• ‘Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo’ (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41 (2013), 27-35.

• ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012), 247-79; reprinted in Epistemology: Major Works, (ed.) R. Neta, (Routledge, 2013); translated by G. Gaboardy into Portugese for Intuitio 9 (2016), 148-181.
• ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012), 84-103.
• ‘Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. [To be translated and published in Portugese, by J. do Carmo].
• ‘In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.) T. Black & K. Becker, 173-92, (Cambridge UP, 2012).
• ‘On Meta-Epistemology’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (2012), 91-108.
• ‘Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments’, Disagreement and Skepticism, (ed.) D. Machuca, 150-68, (Routledge, 2012).
• ‘Hume on Miracles’ (with A. Richmond), The Continuum Companion to Hume, (eds.) A. Bailey & D. O’Brien, 227-45, (Continuum, 2012).
• ‘Two Conceptions of Radical Scepticism’, Ámbitos (invited submission for special issue on Radical Scepticism), 28 (2012), 13-20.

• ‘Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism’, Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed.) D. Machuca, 193-202, (Springer 2011).
• ‘Wittgenstein on Scepticism’, The Oxford Handbook on Wittgenstein, (eds.) O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, 521-47, (Oxford UP, 2011).
• ‘What is the Swamping Problem?’, Reasons for Belief, (eds.) A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen, 244-59, (Cambridge UP, 2011).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem’, Philosophical Issues 21 (2011), 434-55.
• ‘The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Der Begriff des Wissens/Conceptions of Knowledge, (ed.) S. Tolksdorf, 159-78, (de Gruyter, 2011).
• ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59.
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2011).
• ‘Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism’, Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. Dougherty, 362-92, (Oxford UP, 2011).
• ‘Skepticism and Information’ (with E. T. Kerr), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology, (ed.) H. Demir, (Springer, 2011).

• ‘Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination’, Noûs 44 (2010), 245-68.
• ‘Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis’, Synthese 175 (2010), 133-51.
• ‘Absurdity, Angst and The Meaning of Life’, Monist (2010) 93, 3-16.
• ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, (Blackwell, 2010).
• ‘Achievements, Luck and Value’, Think 25 (2010), 1-12.

• ‘Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism’, Synthese 171 (2009), 467-79.
• ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, 19-43, (Cambridge UP, 2009).
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Harvard Review of Philosophy (2009) 16, 2-19.
• ‘Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning’ (with C. Kelp), All Truths Are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, (ed.) J. Salerno, 324-38, (Oxford UP, 2009).
• ‘Defusing Epistemic Relativism’, Synthese 166 (2009), 397-412.
• ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Studies (2009) 143, 407-16.
• ‘Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?’, Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009), 33-45.
• ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, Analysis 69 (2009), 317-25.
• ‘Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17, 589-96.
• ‘Knowledge’, Central Issues of Philosophy, (ed.) J. Shand, 24-36, (Blackwell, 2009).
• ‘Radical Scepticism and Epistemic Value’, Iris (special issue on Contemporary Anti-Scepticism) 1 (2009), 419-28.

• ‘Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements’, Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 437-47.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’, Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82 (2008), 19-41.
• ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford UP, 2008).
• ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.) J. Greco, 437-55, (Oxford UP, 2008).
• ‘Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008), 325-39.
• ‘Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism’, Social Epistemology 22 (2008), 305-23.
• ‘Certainty and Scepticism’, Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 58-67.
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’, Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 66-88.
• ‘A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophica 78 (2008), 13-28.

• ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius’ (with R. Neta), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 381-96.
• ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 158 (2007), 277-97.
• ‘How to be a Neo-Moorean’, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 68-99, (Oxford UP, 2007).
• ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 85-110.
• ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries’, New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) V. F. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard, 28-51, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2007).

• ‘Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck’, Philosophical Studies 116 (2006), 135-45.
• ‘Moral and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 1-25.

• ‘Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206.
• ‘The Structure of Sceptical Arguments’, Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52.
• ‘Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manœuvres’, Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, 85-104, (MIT Press, 2005).
• ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’, Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, 189-224, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge’, Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43.
• ‘Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien (special issue on Contextualism) 67 (2005), 20-43.
• ‘Greco on Scepticism’ (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84.
• ‘Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism’, Acta Analytica 20 (2005), 3-25.

• ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 326-48. [Translated into Portuguese].
• ‘Epistemic Luck’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004), 193-222.
• ‘Epistemic Deflationism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), 103-34.
• ‘The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck’ (with M. Smith), New Ideas in Psychology 22 (2004), 1-28.
• ‘Testimony’, The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, 101-20, (Hart, 2004).
• ‘An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Philosophia 31 (2004), 345-54.
• ‘Some Recent Work in Epistemology’, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 604-13.

• ‘McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism’, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003), 273-94.
• ‘Reforming Reformed Epistemology’, International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66; and reprinted in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, (eds.) R. Rood, S. Roeser & R. van Woudenberg, 177-210, (Rodopi, 2005).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 106-30; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 210-34, (Blackwell, 2003).

• ‘Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57.
• ‘McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments’, Synthese 130 (2002), 279-302.
• ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 283-307.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure’, Theoria 69 (2002), 129-61.
• ‘Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002), 19-55.
• ‘Skepticism, Contemporary’, Internet Encyclopædia of Philosophy (2002).

• ‘Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent’, Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49.
• ‘Scepticism and Dreaming’, Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and “Hinge” Propositions’, Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, 97-122, (Peter Lang, 2001).

• ‘Closure and Context’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80.
• ‘Is “God Exists” a “Hinge” Proposition of Religious Belief?’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40.
• ‘Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge’, Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214.
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