Annalisa Coliva
Chancellor's Professor, Philosophy
School of Humanities
School of Humanities
Co-Director Medical Humanities Minor, Philosophy
School of Humanities
School of Humanities
DECADE Mentor (2022-2025), Philosophy
School of Humanities
School of Humanities
Chair (2017-2022), Philosophy
School of Humanities
School of Humanities
Director Medical Humanities Emphasis Graduate Program (2022-2023), Philosophy
School of Humanities
School of Humanities
Inclusive Excellence Professor (2022-2024)
Other not listed
Other not listed
Ph.D., St Andrews (UK), 2001, Philosophy
Ph.D., Università del Piemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro", Vercelli, Italy, 2001, Philosophy of language
M.A., St Andrews (UK), 1997, Philosophy
B.A., Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy, 1996, Philosophy
Ph.D., Università del Piemonte Orientale "Amedeo Avogadro", Vercelli, Italy, 2001, Philosophy of language
M.A., St Andrews (UK), 1997, Philosophy
B.A., Università degli Studi di Bologna, Italy, 1996, Philosophy
University of California, Irvine
56 Humanities Instructional Building
Mail Code: 4555
Irvine, CA 92697
56 Humanities Instructional Building
Mail Code: 4555
Irvine, CA 92697
Research Interests
Epistemology, Philosophy of mind and language, History of Analytic Philosophy.
Academic Distinctions
2025 Invited Professor, Yonsei University, Underwood International College, (Seoul, South Korea).
2024 Invited Professor, Summer School on The Significance of Scepticism in Philosophy, Judaism, and Culture, Maimonides’ Center, Institute of Advanced Studies, Hamburg University.
2022 Invited Professor, 4th Epistemology Summer School (Urbino, Italy).
2021 Invited Professor, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa (Italy) (online).
2020-2023 Invited Professor, University of Lugano (CH), Philosophy Institute (online).
2019-22 Chancellor Fellow at UCI.
2014 O'Brien Distinguished Professorship, Scripps College, California.
2013 Chargé de cours, Department of Philosophy, Genève (CH).
2011 & 2012 Visiting Fellow, Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS, Paris).
2009 Invited Professor at Paris 7-Denis Diderot, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.
2007 Bogliasco Research Fellow.
20026 and 2007 Alexander von Humboldt Fellow (Heidelberg).
2004 Italian Academy Research Fellow (Columbia University, NY)
2021-22 Fulbright Research Scholar (Columbia University, NY)
2024 Invited Professor, Summer School on The Significance of Scepticism in Philosophy, Judaism, and Culture, Maimonides’ Center, Institute of Advanced Studies, Hamburg University.
2022 Invited Professor, 4th Epistemology Summer School (Urbino, Italy).
2021 Invited Professor, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa (Italy) (online).
2020-2023 Invited Professor, University of Lugano (CH), Philosophy Institute (online).
2019-22 Chancellor Fellow at UCI.
2014 O'Brien Distinguished Professorship, Scripps College, California.
2013 Chargé de cours, Department of Philosophy, Genève (CH).
2011 & 2012 Visiting Fellow, Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS, Paris).
2009 Invited Professor at Paris 7-Denis Diderot, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.
2007 Bogliasco Research Fellow.
20026 and 2007 Alexander von Humboldt Fellow (Heidelberg).
2004 Italian Academy Research Fellow (Columbia University, NY)
2021-22 Fulbright Research Scholar (Columbia University, NY)
Appointments
2010-2016 Associate Professor, Department of Sciences of language and culture, UNIMORE.
2005-2010 Assistant Professor (tenured), Department of Sciences of language and culture, UNIMORE;
2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Sciences of Culture, UNIMORE;
2001-2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg (CH);
2000-2002 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna;
2001-2002 Temporary lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna.
2005-2010 Assistant Professor (tenured), Department of Sciences of language and culture, UNIMORE;
2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Sciences of Culture, UNIMORE;
2001-2003 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg (CH);
2000-2002 Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna;
2001-2002 Temporary lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Bologna.
Research Abstract
In epistemology, I have developed a constitutivist form of "hinge epistemology"--a term that I coined for a new trend in epistemology inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty. I have explored its bearing on the structure of justification, skepticism, relativism, testimony, disagreement, and knowledge of basic logical laws and other basic principles of human inquiry.
Lately, I have developed this framework to deal with various issues in social epistemology (testimony, disagreement, trust, epistemic injustice and authority) and in their applications in the medical context and to the dissemination of knowledge in the digital era.
In philosophy of mind, I have worked on indexicals, particularly 'I', and demonstratives, on the nature of perceptual content and on the nature of concepts and of intentional mental states.
At the interface between epistemology and the philosophy of mind, I have developed a pluralistic account of self-knowledge and have explored its bearing on the issue of self-deception, Moore's paradox and the possibility of intrapersonal disagreement.
In the history of analytic philosophy my work concerns mostly G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein with special reference to their contributions to epistemology. Lately, I have worked on Susan Stebbing - the first woman Philosophy Professor in Britain in the 1930's - and Friedrich Waismann - a member of the Vienna Circle, migrated to the UK after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany -, with special attention to their contributions to metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language.
Lately, I have developed this framework to deal with various issues in social epistemology (testimony, disagreement, trust, epistemic injustice and authority) and in their applications in the medical context and to the dissemination of knowledge in the digital era.
In philosophy of mind, I have worked on indexicals, particularly 'I', and demonstratives, on the nature of perceptual content and on the nature of concepts and of intentional mental states.
At the interface between epistemology and the philosophy of mind, I have developed a pluralistic account of self-knowledge and have explored its bearing on the issue of self-deception, Moore's paradox and the possibility of intrapersonal disagreement.
In the history of analytic philosophy my work concerns mostly G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein with special reference to their contributions to epistemology. Lately, I have worked on Susan Stebbing - the first woman Philosophy Professor in Britain in the 1930's - and Friedrich Waismann - a member of the Vienna Circle, migrated to the UK after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany -, with special attention to their contributions to metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language.
Publications
Books
(1) Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(2) Wittgenstein on Social Epistemology (Wittgenstein Cambridge Element series), Cambridge University Press, 2025.
(3) (with D. Pritchard) Skepticism, London-New York, Routledge, 2022.
(4) Wittgenstein Rehinged, Anthem, 2022.
(5) (with M. Baghramian) Relativism, Routledge, 2020.
(6) The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London, Palgrave, 2016
(7) Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. London, Palgrave, 2015
(8) Scetticismo. Dubbio, paradosso, conoscenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2012.
(9) Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, London, Palgrave, 2010.
(10) I modi del relativismo, Laterza, Roma, 2009.
(11) (with E. Lalumera) Pensare. Leggi ed errori del ragionamento, Carocci, Roma, 2006/1, 2014/4.
(12) I concetti. Teorie ed esercizi, Carocci, Roma, 2004/1, 2007/2.
(13) Moore e Wittgenstein: scetticismo, certezza e senso comune, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003.
(14) (with E. Sacchi) Singular Thoughts. Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts and I-Thoughts, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2001.
(1) Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(2) Wittgenstein on Social Epistemology (Wittgenstein Cambridge Element series), Cambridge University Press, 2025.
(3) (with D. Pritchard) Skepticism, London-New York, Routledge, 2022.
(4) Wittgenstein Rehinged, Anthem, 2022.
(5) (with M. Baghramian) Relativism, Routledge, 2020.
(6) The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London, Palgrave, 2016
(7) Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. London, Palgrave, 2015
(8) Scetticismo. Dubbio, paradosso, conoscenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2012.
(9) Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, London, Palgrave, 2010.
(10) I modi del relativismo, Laterza, Roma, 2009.
(11) (with E. Lalumera) Pensare. Leggi ed errori del ragionamento, Carocci, Roma, 2006/1, 2014/4.
(12) I concetti. Teorie ed esercizi, Carocci, Roma, 2004/1, 2007/2.
(13) Moore e Wittgenstein: scetticismo, certezza e senso comune, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003.
(14) (with E. Sacchi) Singular Thoughts. Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts and I-Thoughts, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2001.
Edited Books
(1) (with L. Doulas) (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025.
(2) Frege on Language, Logic and Psychology. Eva Picardi. Selected Essays, Oxford University Press, 2022.
(3) The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Normativity and Meaning, from Wittgenstein to American Neo-pragmatism, London, Bloomsbury, 2020.
(4) (with P. Leonardi and S. Moruzzi) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave, 2018.
(5) (with N. Pedersen) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, 2017.
(6) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock) Hinge Epistemology, Brill, 2016.
(7) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock and V. Munz) Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015.
(8) (with C. Calabi, A. Sereni & G. Volpe) Teorie della conoscenza. Il dibattito contemporaneo, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2015.
(9) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(10) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(11) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007.
(12) (with E. Picardi) Wittgenstein Today, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004.
(1) (with L. Doulas) (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025.
(2) Frege on Language, Logic and Psychology. Eva Picardi. Selected Essays, Oxford University Press, 2022.
(3) The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Normativity and Meaning, from Wittgenstein to American Neo-pragmatism, London, Bloomsbury, 2020.
(4) (with P. Leonardi and S. Moruzzi) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave, 2018.
(5) (with N. Pedersen) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, 2017.
(6) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock) Hinge Epistemology, Brill, 2016.
(7) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock and V. Munz) Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015.
(8) (with C. Calabi, A. Sereni & G. Volpe) Teorie della conoscenza. Il dibattito contemporaneo, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2015.
(9) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(10) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.
(11) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007.
(12) (with E. Picardi) Wittgenstein Today, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004.
Papers
(1) “Against quasi-fideism”, Religions 16, 2025: 1-14.
(2) “Deep disagreements and the genealogical challenge”, Synthese, 2025: 1-23.
(3) “Morphology, knowledge, and understanding. Prolegomena to a pluralist manifesto”, Philosophical Studies, 2025: 1-21.
(4) “Hinge trust”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2025: 1-20.
(5) “Morphology and metaphilosophy: Waismann, Wittgenstein and Goethe”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 13, 2024: 1–23.
(6) “More and happier women. On the political significance of Wittgenstein and hinge epistemology”, Hypatia, 2024:1-17.
(7) “Woman. Concept, prototype, and stereotype”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-10.
(8) “Hysteria, HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE, and conceptual engineering”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-13.
(9) (with A. Boncompagni). “Liminal identities and epistemic injustice: Introduction to the Special Issue”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-6.
(10) (with M. Palmira) Immunity to error through misidentification: some trends, Philosophical Psychology, 2024: 1-36.
(11) “You just believe that because … it’s a hinge”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 47, 2023: 53-71.
(12) “Hinges in the knowledge economy. On Greco’s common and procedural knowledge”, Synthese, 201, 2023: 1-18.
(13) “Wittgenstein et le pragmatisme. Réflexions sur Le Doute en Question de Claudine Tiercelin”, Klesis. Revue Philosophique, 56, 2023: 1-10.
(14) (with L. Doulas) “What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On”, Synthese, 2022: 1-14.
(15) "Doubts, philosophy and therapy", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 45, 2021: 1-23.
(16) “Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29, 2021: 914-934.
(17) (with M. Palmira) "Disagreement unhinged constitutivism-style", Metaphilosophy, 2021, 52/3-4 : 402-415.
(18) “Strange bedfellows. On Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology”, Synthese 198, 2021: 3521–3532
(19) "Are there mathematical hinges?", International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10/3-4, 2020: 346-366.
(20) "Skepticism unhinged", Belgrade Journal of Philosophy 32, 2019: 7-23.
(21)"Testimonial hinges", Philosophical Issues, 29, 2019: 53-68.
(22) "Disagreeing with myself. Doxastic commitments, Moore's paradox and belief revision", American Philosophical Quarterly, 56/1, 2019: 15-28.
(23) "Precis of The Varieties of Self-Knowledge", Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 47, 2019: 281-291.
(24) "Replies to commentators", Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 47, 2019: 343-352.
(25) "What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein", International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 8/3, 2018: 198-207.
(26) “Précis of Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7/4, 2017: 217-234.
(27) “Replies to commentators”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7/4, 2017: 281-295.
(28) “Stopping points: I, immunity and the real guarantee”, Inquiry, 60/3, 2017: 233-252.
(29) “Which hinge epistemology?”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2016: 79-96.
(30) “Io: un indicale essenziale?”, Iride, 2016: 341-346.
(31) “How to perceive reasons”, Episteme 13/1, 2016: 77-88.
(32) “How to commit Moore’s paradox”, The Journal of Philosophy, CXII/4, 2015: 169-192.
(33) (with S. Moruzzi) “Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism”, Iride, XXVI/73, 2014: 537-554.
(34) (with A. Sereni) “Crispin Wright”, Profili, Aphex, Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 2014, http://www.aphex.it/public/file/Content20110706_ProfiloWright.pdf
(35) “Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense”, Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013: 1-12.
(36) “Replies“, Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013: 81-96.
(37) (with D. Belleri) “Some observations on François Recanati's Mental Files”, Disputatio 5/36, 2013: 1-11.
(38) “Sulle origini dell'oggettività”, Iride, 68, 2013: 183-189.
(39) “Dal senso ai sensi... e ritorno”, E/C VII/17, 2013: 63-67.
(40) (with S. Moruzzi) "Truth-relativists can’t trump moral progress", Analytic Philosophy, 53/1, 2012: 47-56.
(41) “Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission--what else?!), Synthese, 189/2, 2012: 235-254.
(42) “Percepire le ragioni?”, Iride, 65, 2012: 119-132.
(43) “Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing as”, Synthese, 186/1, 2012: 121-148.
(44) “Critical notice of Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity”, Disputatio, 4/33, 2012: 515-530.
(45) “Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?”, Philosophical Investigations 33/1, 2010: 1-23.
(46) “Moore's Proof and Martin Davies' epistemic projects”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1, 2010: 101-116.
(47) “Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and ‘la corruttela’”, Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 38/1, 2010: 29-39.
(48) “Self-knowledge and commitments”, Synthese, 171/3, 2009: 365-375.
(49) “The paradox of Moore’s Proof of an external world”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 2008: 234-243.
(50) “Tu chiamale se vuoi ‘emozioni’”, in F. Cimatti (a cura di), Linguaggio ed emozioni, Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università della Calabria, 24, 2009: 71-85.
(51) “Peacocke’s self-knowledge”, Ratio, XXI/1, 2008: 13-27.
(52) “Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico”, Jura Gentium, IV, 2008. http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/it/forum/marconi/coliva.htm
(53) “Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore”, Epistemologia, 29/1, 2006: 61-78.
(54) “Error through misidentification: some varieties”, The Journal of Philosophy, CIII/8, 2006: 403-425.
(55) “Self-Knowledge. One More Constitutive View”, Preprints Dipartimento di Filosofia, 28, 2006: 101-121.
(56) “Error through misidentification, the split between semantic and speaker’s reference and the real guarantee”, The Journal of Philosophy, C/8, 2003: 416-431.
(57) “Moore: scetticismo e senso comune”, Lingua e Stile, 32/2, 1997: 167-188.
(58) “The Problem of the Finer-Grained Content of Experience. A Redefinition of its Role within the Debate between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003: 57-70.
(59) “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002: 27-34.
(60) “On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought. A Reply to John Campbell”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002: 41-46.
(61) “Wright and McDowell on the Content of Perception and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs”, Lingua e Stile, 36/1, 2001: 3-23.
Book Chapters
(1) (with T. Mark) “Ryle and self-knowledge”, in M. Dougherty (ed.) The Rylean Mind, London-New York, Routledge, 2026, in press.
(2) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock and D. Pritchard) “Moyal-Sharrock’s, Pritchard’s and Coliva’s Wittgenstein: The hinge epistemology program”, in G. Kemp and A. Hossein Khani (eds.) Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers, Routledge, 2026, in press.
(3) (with L. Doulas) “Philosophical (and scientific) progress. A hinge account”, in S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.) Philosophy with Attitude, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(4) (with E. Mark) “Transparency overextended”, C. Wright. S. Rocas and G. Melis (eds.) Self-Knowledge and the A Priori, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(5) (with M. Panza) “Is numerical cognition cognition of natural numbers?”, in W. Carnielli (ed.) Logic, Semantics, and Algebraic Methods, Dordrecht, Springer, forthcoming.
(6) “Religious conflict examined through a hinge-theoretic framework”, in C. Bagnoli and V. Pacillo (eds.) Religious Authority and Conflict: Analyses and Hypotheses, London-New York, Routledge, London-New York, Routledge, 2026: 127–143.
(7) “Strawson on liberal naturalism, Hume and Wittgenstein. An appraisal”, in J. Hyman et al. (eds.) Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism, Brill, 2025: 234-257.
(8) “’So one cannot say “There are objects” as one can say “There are books”’. From TLP 4.1272 to Carnap, via OC 35-37”, in E. Heinrich-Ramharter, A. Pichler, F. Stadler (eds.) 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – 70 Years After Wittgenstein’s Death. An Assessment, Proceedings of the 44th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2023, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2025: 303-318.
(9) “The significance of Stebbing’s work on analysis”, in A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025: 31-51.
(10) (with L. Doulas) “Analysis, common sense, and public philosophy. Themes from the philosophy of Susan Stebbing”, in A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025: 1-28.
(11) “Skepticism and the ordinary. Further reflections on Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?”, Kennedy, J. (ed.) Penelope Maddy, Outstanding Contributions to Logic Series, Springer, 2024: 299-310.
(12) “On the hypothetical given. Experiences, views, and proofs”, in O. Beck and M. Vuletic (eds.) Experience and Logic. Essays in honor of Anil Gupta, Dordrecht, Springer, 2024: 55-67.
(13) “(with A. Gupta and C. Wright) “A debate on skepticism and perceptual belief”, in O. Beck and M. Vuletic (eds.) Experience and Logic. Essays in honor of Anil Gupta, Dordrecht, Springer, 2024: 355-390.
(14) “Hinge epistemology and propositional vs. doxastic justification”, P. Silva & L. Olivera (eds.) Propositional vs. Doxastic Justification, Routledge, 2022: 162-180.
(15) “Which hinge epistemology, between animal, biscopic and constitutivist?”, D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis (eds.) Extending Hinge Epistemology, Anthem, 2022: 51-70.
(16) (with L. Doulas) “Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement”
In J.A. Carter, M. Baghramian, and R. Rowland (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, London, Routledge, 2025: 38-50.
(17) “Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions”
In P. Silva and L. Oliveira (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justifications: New Essays on their Nature and Significance, London/New York, Routledge: 162–180.
(18) "I know, I know, I know. Hinge Epistemology, invariantism and skepticism", in C. Kyriachou and J. Wallbridge (eds.) Invariantism and skepticism, London, Routledge, 2021: 213-234.
(19) "Which hinge epistemology between animal, biscopic and constitutivist?", in D. Moyal-Sharrock and C. Sandis (eds.) Hinge Epistemology, London, Anthem, 2021.
(20) "Wittgenstein's critique of logical atomism in the Philosophical Investigations", in U. Zilioli (ed.) Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, 2020: 301-311.
(21) “Hinges, radical skepticism, relativism and alethic pluralism”, in N. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.) Non-evidentialist Epistemology, Brill, 2021: 97-117.
(22) “In quest of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology”, in N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.) Looking at Things From the Point of View of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Springer, 2020: 107-121.
(23) (with Michele Palmira) "Hinge disagreement", in Kusch, M. (ed.) Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism, Routledge, 2020: 11-29.
(24) "Waismann on belief and knowledge", in S. Shapiro and D. Makovec (eds.) Friedrich Waismann. The Open Testure of Analytic Philosophy, London, Palgrave, 2019: 89-106.
(25) “Hinge epistemology and relativism”, in M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, 2019: 320-328
(26) (with S. Moruzzi) “Dialetheism in action: a new strategy for solving the equal validity paradox”, in A. Rieger and G. Young (eds.) Dialetheism and Its Applications, Springer, 2019: 57-80.
(27) "What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be", in Epistemic Realism and Anti-Realism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. Edited by R. McKenna and C. Kyriacou, London, Palgrave, 2018: 267-288.
(28) "Practical knowledge and linguistic competence", in A. Coliva. S. Moruzzi and P. Leonardi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave, 2018.
(29) “Moore and Mooreanism”, in B. Reed and D. Machuca (eds.), Scepticism. From Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, 2018: 467-480.
(30) “Against Wittgensteinian entitlements”, in N. Jang Lee Ling Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press, 2020: 327-343.
(31) "Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer", in Beale J., Kidd I.J. (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism, Oxford-New York: Routledge, 2017: 39-58.
(32) “Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature”, in T. Raleigh and K. Cahill (eds.) Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Oxford-New York, Routledge, 2018: 96-118.
(33) (with D. Belleri) “Gettier and context”, in S. Hetherington (ed.) Gettier and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 2018: 78-95..
(34) “Self-knowing interpreters”, in J. Kirsch and P. Pedrini (eds.) Third Person Self-Knowledge, Interpretation and Narrative, Springer, 2018: 13-29.
(35) “How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge”, in A. Coliva and N. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, 2017: 253-284.
(36) "Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein", in A. Contini, E. Moietta, A. Ramploud (eds.) Metamorfosi delle differenze, Roma, Aracne, 2015: 119-147.
(37) “Wittgenstein. Quattro temi dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer”, in D. Generali (ed.) Le radici della razionalità critica: saperi, pratiche, teleologie. Saggi in onore di Fabio Minazzi, Udine, Mimesis, 2015: 86-105.
(38) “Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean skepticism”, in D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014: 248-272.
(39) (with S. Moruzzi) “Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox”, in F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell´Utri (eds.) New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, 2014: 38-62.
(40) (with M. C. Amoretti) “Epistemology”, in T. Andina (ed.) Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide. A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy - Brill Leiden-Boston, 2014: 38-64.
(41) “Scepticism and knowledge”, M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013: 975-1002.
(42) (with M. Palmira) “Relativismo e multiculturalismo”, in C. Baraldi (ed.) Gli invisibili. La condizione degli immigrati nella società, Bonanno, Roma, 2012: 19-39.
(43) (with C. Amoretti) “Epistemologia (o della conoscenza)”, in T. Andina (ed.) Filosofia contemporanea. Uno sguardo globale, Roma, Carocci, 2012: 59-91.
(44) “Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives—is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP, 2012: 323-351.
(45) “One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism”, A. Coliva (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012: 212-242.
(46) “Which key to all mythologies about the self?”, F. Recanati and S. Prosser (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012: 22-45.
(47) (with M. Palmira) “Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein”, in R. Davies (ed.) Analisi, Milano, Mimesis, 2011: 291-304.
(48) “Wittgenstein out of context”, in C. Jaeger, W. Loeffler (eds.) Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 7-13 2011, Kirchberg am Wechsel: 50-51.
(49) “Sull'idea stessa di relativismo”, in V. Villa (ed.) Relativismo: temi e prospettive, Roma, Aracne, 2010: 155-175.
(50) “La verità di Rorty, tra Vattimo e Marconi”, M. Carrara e V. Morato (eds.) Verità, Udine-Milano, Mimesis, 2010: 261-270.
(51) “Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo?”, in Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Rappresentazione, percezione e coscienza, ETS, Pisa, 2009: 95-113.
(52) “What kind of entities are concepts?”, in D. Gambarara, A. Givigliano (eds.) Origine e sviluppo del linguaggio, fra teoria e storia. Atti del XV Convegno della Società di filosofia del linguaggio, Aracne editrice, Roma, 2009: 211-219.
(53) “Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?”, in F. Giuliani e M. Barni (eds.) Il logos nella polis. La diversità delle lingue e delle culture, le nostre identità. Atti del XIV Convegno della Società di Filosofia del linguaggio, Roma, Aracne, 2008: 439-452.
(54) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007: 255-280.
(55) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in M. De Caro, E. Spinelli (eds.) Lo scetticismo antico e contemporaneo, Carocci, Roma, 2007: 186-210.
(56) “Moore’s paradox and commitments. On this very complicated concept of belief”, in P. Leonardi (ed.) Facets of concepts, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2005: 233-252.
(57) “Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor”, in A. Coliva and E. Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004: 411-429.
(58) “Moore’s Proof of an external world. Just begging the question”, in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner (eds.) Proceedings Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg XI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003: 91-96.
(59) “Io pensieri e metafisica dell’io: ovvero dell’anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e analitica”, in M. Carrara, G. De Anna, S. Magrin (eds.) Saggi di filosofia del linguaggio, filosofia della mente e metafisica, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003: 193-213.
(60) “In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione”, in P. Parrini (a cura di) Conoscenza e cognizione, Guerini, Milano, 2002: 147-161.
(61) “Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Uses of ‘I’ as Subject and as Object at the Origin of the No-Subject View about the Self and its Solution”, in Berit Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality Pre-proceedings of the 24th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2000: 117-122.
(62) “Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo”, in D. Marconi (ed.) Naturalismo e naturalizzazione, Mercurio edizioni, Vercelli, 1999: 169-187.
Reviews
(1) (with E. Mark) A. Byrne Transparency and Self-Knowledge, Mind 130, 2021 pp. 1039–1049.
(2) S. Goldberg Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, on-line first, 2018: 1-6.
(3) M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre De Se Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, Analysis Reviews, 2018: 1-4.
(4) Anna Boncompagni "Wittgenstein and Pragmatism. On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and James", 2016, Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 6/4, 2018.
(5) Duncan Pritchard Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton UP, 2016”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016,
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/68056-epistemic-angst-radical-skepticism-and-the-groundlessness-of-our-believing/
(6) Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans, OUP, 2014”, Analysis, 2015: doi: 10.1093/analysis7anv078
(7) Julia Tanney, Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2013”, Analysis, 74, 2014, pp. 353-355.
(8) Jordi Fernandez, Transparent Minds, OUP 2013”, Theoria, 81, 2014, pp. 442-445.
(9) G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, CUP, 2013”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.06.33, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40885-personal-identity-complex-or-simple/.
(10) N. Vassallo, Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza, Feltrinelli, 2011”, Iride XXVI/70, 2013, pp. 670-672.
(11) A. Paternoster, Il filosofo e i sensi, Carocci, 2007”, Il Protagora, 12, 2008, pp. 552-554.
(12) Lalumera, E. Normatività e concetti, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004”, 2R, 6, 2007, pp. 12-19.
(13) Vignolo, M. Afferrare pensieri, Carocci, Roma 2001”, Epistemologia, 2004, pp. 356-359.
(14) Paternoster, A. Linguaggio e visione, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2001”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003, pp. 97-99.
(15) Bermúdez, J. L. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, MIT, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 582-586.
(16) Cassam, Q. Self and World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp.654-656.
(17) Wright, C., Smith, B. C., Macdonald, C., (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 586-589.
(18) McDowell, J. Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)- London, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 652-654.
(19) Dionigi, R. La fatica di descrivere. Itinerario di Wittgenstein nel linguaggio della filosofia, Vallecchi editore, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1998, 33, pp. 669-676.
(20) Bruschwig, J., Nussbaum, M. 1996 (eds.) Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge, CUP”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 655-656.
(21) Kim, J. 1996 Philosophy of Mind, Boulder (Colorado)-Oxford, Westview Press”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 608-611.
(22) McGinn, M. 1997 Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London and New York, Routledge”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 583-588.
(23) Stroll, A. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 588-595.
(24) Haldane, J., Wright, C. (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection, New York-Oxford, OUP, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 665-666.
(25) Williams, M. (ed.), Scepticism, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 663-664.
Encyclopedic entries, miscellaneous
(1) "Eva Picardi. Un ricordo", Il Protagora, 44/27-28, 2017, pp. 411-415.
(2) “Self-knowledge”. SAGE Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. by Hal Pashler, 2013.
(3) (with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock) Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographies On-line, 2010, http://oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0127
(4) “La filosofia analitica”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 398-412.
(5) “Wittgenstein”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 419-432.
(6) “Linguaggio e filosofia”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 442-452.
(1) “Against quasi-fideism”, Religions 16, 2025: 1-14.
(2) “Deep disagreements and the genealogical challenge”, Synthese, 2025: 1-23.
(3) “Morphology, knowledge, and understanding. Prolegomena to a pluralist manifesto”, Philosophical Studies, 2025: 1-21.
(4) “Hinge trust”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2025: 1-20.
(5) “Morphology and metaphilosophy: Waismann, Wittgenstein and Goethe”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 13, 2024: 1–23.
(6) “More and happier women. On the political significance of Wittgenstein and hinge epistemology”, Hypatia, 2024:1-17.
(7) “Woman. Concept, prototype, and stereotype”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-10.
(8) “Hysteria, HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE, and conceptual engineering”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-13.
(9) (with A. Boncompagni). “Liminal identities and epistemic injustice: Introduction to the Special Issue”, Social Epistemology, 2024: 1-6.
(10) (with M. Palmira) Immunity to error through misidentification: some trends, Philosophical Psychology, 2024: 1-36.
(11) “You just believe that because … it’s a hinge”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 47, 2023: 53-71.
(12) “Hinges in the knowledge economy. On Greco’s common and procedural knowledge”, Synthese, 201, 2023: 1-18.
(13) “Wittgenstein et le pragmatisme. Réflexions sur Le Doute en Question de Claudine Tiercelin”, Klesis. Revue Philosophique, 56, 2023: 1-10.
(14) (with L. Doulas) “What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On”, Synthese, 2022: 1-14.
(15) "Doubts, philosophy and therapy", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 45, 2021: 1-23.
(16) “Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29, 2021: 914-934.
(17) (with M. Palmira) "Disagreement unhinged constitutivism-style", Metaphilosophy, 2021, 52/3-4 : 402-415.
(18) “Strange bedfellows. On Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology”, Synthese 198, 2021: 3521–3532
(19) "Are there mathematical hinges?", International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10/3-4, 2020: 346-366.
(20) "Skepticism unhinged", Belgrade Journal of Philosophy 32, 2019: 7-23.
(21)"Testimonial hinges", Philosophical Issues, 29, 2019: 53-68.
(22) "Disagreeing with myself. Doxastic commitments, Moore's paradox and belief revision", American Philosophical Quarterly, 56/1, 2019: 15-28.
(23) "Precis of The Varieties of Self-Knowledge", Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 47, 2019: 281-291.
(24) "Replies to commentators", Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 47, 2019: 343-352.
(25) "What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein", International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 8/3, 2018: 198-207.
(26) “Précis of Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7/4, 2017: 217-234.
(27) “Replies to commentators”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7/4, 2017: 281-295.
(28) “Stopping points: I, immunity and the real guarantee”, Inquiry, 60/3, 2017: 233-252.
(29) “Which hinge epistemology?”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2016: 79-96.
(30) “Io: un indicale essenziale?”, Iride, 2016: 341-346.
(31) “How to perceive reasons”, Episteme 13/1, 2016: 77-88.
(32) “How to commit Moore’s paradox”, The Journal of Philosophy, CXII/4, 2015: 169-192.
(33) (with S. Moruzzi) “Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism”, Iride, XXVI/73, 2014: 537-554.
(34) (with A. Sereni) “Crispin Wright”, Profili, Aphex, Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 2014, http://www.aphex.it/public/file/Content20110706_ProfiloWright.pdf
(35) “Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense”, Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013: 1-12.
(36) “Replies“, Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 41, 2013: 81-96.
(37) (with D. Belleri) “Some observations on François Recanati's Mental Files”, Disputatio 5/36, 2013: 1-11.
(38) “Sulle origini dell'oggettività”, Iride, 68, 2013: 183-189.
(39) “Dal senso ai sensi... e ritorno”, E/C VII/17, 2013: 63-67.
(40) (with S. Moruzzi) "Truth-relativists can’t trump moral progress", Analytic Philosophy, 53/1, 2012: 47-56.
(41) “Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission--what else?!), Synthese, 189/2, 2012: 235-254.
(42) “Percepire le ragioni?”, Iride, 65, 2012: 119-132.
(43) “Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing as”, Synthese, 186/1, 2012: 121-148.
(44) “Critical notice of Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity”, Disputatio, 4/33, 2012: 515-530.
(45) “Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?”, Philosophical Investigations 33/1, 2010: 1-23.
(46) “Moore's Proof and Martin Davies' epistemic projects”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1, 2010: 101-116.
(47) “Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and ‘la corruttela’”, Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 38/1, 2010: 29-39.
(48) “Self-knowledge and commitments”, Synthese, 171/3, 2009: 365-375.
(49) “The paradox of Moore’s Proof of an external world”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 2008: 234-243.
(50) “Tu chiamale se vuoi ‘emozioni’”, in F. Cimatti (a cura di), Linguaggio ed emozioni, Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università della Calabria, 24, 2009: 71-85.
(51) “Peacocke’s self-knowledge”, Ratio, XXI/1, 2008: 13-27.
(52) “Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico”, Jura Gentium, IV, 2008. http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/it/forum/marconi/coliva.htm
(53) “Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore”, Epistemologia, 29/1, 2006: 61-78.
(54) “Error through misidentification: some varieties”, The Journal of Philosophy, CIII/8, 2006: 403-425.
(55) “Self-Knowledge. One More Constitutive View”, Preprints Dipartimento di Filosofia, 28, 2006: 101-121.
(56) “Error through misidentification, the split between semantic and speaker’s reference and the real guarantee”, The Journal of Philosophy, C/8, 2003: 416-431.
(57) “Moore: scetticismo e senso comune”, Lingua e Stile, 32/2, 1997: 167-188.
(58) “The Problem of the Finer-Grained Content of Experience. A Redefinition of its Role within the Debate between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003: 57-70.
(59) “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002: 27-34.
(60) “On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought. A Reply to John Campbell”, in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9/1, 2002: 41-46.
(61) “Wright and McDowell on the Content of Perception and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs”, Lingua e Stile, 36/1, 2001: 3-23.
Book Chapters
(1) (with T. Mark) “Ryle and self-knowledge”, in M. Dougherty (ed.) The Rylean Mind, London-New York, Routledge, 2026, in press.
(2) (with D. Moyal-Sharrock and D. Pritchard) “Moyal-Sharrock’s, Pritchard’s and Coliva’s Wittgenstein: The hinge epistemology program”, in G. Kemp and A. Hossein Khani (eds.) Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers, Routledge, 2026, in press.
(3) (with L. Doulas) “Philosophical (and scientific) progress. A hinge account”, in S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds.) Philosophy with Attitude, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(4) (with E. Mark) “Transparency overextended”, C. Wright. S. Rocas and G. Melis (eds.) Self-Knowledge and the A Priori, Oxford University Press, 2026, in press.
(5) (with M. Panza) “Is numerical cognition cognition of natural numbers?”, in W. Carnielli (ed.) Logic, Semantics, and Algebraic Methods, Dordrecht, Springer, forthcoming.
(6) “Religious conflict examined through a hinge-theoretic framework”, in C. Bagnoli and V. Pacillo (eds.) Religious Authority and Conflict: Analyses and Hypotheses, London-New York, Routledge, London-New York, Routledge, 2026: 127–143.
(7) “Strawson on liberal naturalism, Hume and Wittgenstein. An appraisal”, in J. Hyman et al. (eds.) Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism, Brill, 2025: 234-257.
(8) “’So one cannot say “There are objects” as one can say “There are books”’. From TLP 4.1272 to Carnap, via OC 35-37”, in E. Heinrich-Ramharter, A. Pichler, F. Stadler (eds.) 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – 70 Years After Wittgenstein’s Death. An Assessment, Proceedings of the 44th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2023, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2025: 303-318.
(9) “The significance of Stebbing’s work on analysis”, in A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025: 31-51.
(10) (with L. Doulas) “Analysis, common sense, and public philosophy. Themes from the philosophy of Susan Stebbing”, in A. Coliva and L. Doulas (eds.) Analysis, Common Sense and Public Philosophy. Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025: 1-28.
(11) “Skepticism and the ordinary. Further reflections on Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?”, Kennedy, J. (ed.) Penelope Maddy, Outstanding Contributions to Logic Series, Springer, 2024: 299-310.
(12) “On the hypothetical given. Experiences, views, and proofs”, in O. Beck and M. Vuletic (eds.) Experience and Logic. Essays in honor of Anil Gupta, Dordrecht, Springer, 2024: 55-67.
(13) “(with A. Gupta and C. Wright) “A debate on skepticism and perceptual belief”, in O. Beck and M. Vuletic (eds.) Experience and Logic. Essays in honor of Anil Gupta, Dordrecht, Springer, 2024: 355-390.
(14) “Hinge epistemology and propositional vs. doxastic justification”, P. Silva & L. Olivera (eds.) Propositional vs. Doxastic Justification, Routledge, 2022: 162-180.
(15) “Which hinge epistemology, between animal, biscopic and constitutivist?”, D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis (eds.) Extending Hinge Epistemology, Anthem, 2022: 51-70.
(16) (with L. Doulas) “Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement”
In J.A. Carter, M. Baghramian, and R. Rowland (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, London, Routledge, 2025: 38-50.
(17) “Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions”
In P. Silva and L. Oliveira (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justifications: New Essays on their Nature and Significance, London/New York, Routledge: 162–180.
(18) "I know, I know, I know. Hinge Epistemology, invariantism and skepticism", in C. Kyriachou and J. Wallbridge (eds.) Invariantism and skepticism, London, Routledge, 2021: 213-234.
(19) "Which hinge epistemology between animal, biscopic and constitutivist?", in D. Moyal-Sharrock and C. Sandis (eds.) Hinge Epistemology, London, Anthem, 2021.
(20) "Wittgenstein's critique of logical atomism in the Philosophical Investigations", in U. Zilioli (ed.) Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, 2020: 301-311.
(21) “Hinges, radical skepticism, relativism and alethic pluralism”, in N. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.) Non-evidentialist Epistemology, Brill, 2021: 97-117.
(22) “In quest of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology”, in N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.) Looking at Things From the Point of View of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Springer, 2020: 107-121.
(23) (with Michele Palmira) "Hinge disagreement", in Kusch, M. (ed.) Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism, Routledge, 2020: 11-29.
(24) "Waismann on belief and knowledge", in S. Shapiro and D. Makovec (eds.) Friedrich Waismann. The Open Testure of Analytic Philosophy, London, Palgrave, 2019: 89-106.
(25) “Hinge epistemology and relativism”, in M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, 2019: 320-328
(26) (with S. Moruzzi) “Dialetheism in action: a new strategy for solving the equal validity paradox”, in A. Rieger and G. Young (eds.) Dialetheism and Its Applications, Springer, 2019: 57-80.
(27) "What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be", in Epistemic Realism and Anti-Realism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. Edited by R. McKenna and C. Kyriacou, London, Palgrave, 2018: 267-288.
(28) "Practical knowledge and linguistic competence", in A. Coliva. S. Moruzzi and P. Leonardi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave, 2018.
(29) “Moore and Mooreanism”, in B. Reed and D. Machuca (eds.), Scepticism. From Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, 2018: 467-480.
(30) “Against Wittgensteinian entitlements”, in N. Jang Lee Ling Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press, 2020: 327-343.
(31) "Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer", in Beale J., Kidd I.J. (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism, Oxford-New York: Routledge, 2017: 39-58.
(32) “Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature”, in T. Raleigh and K. Cahill (eds.) Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Oxford-New York, Routledge, 2018: 96-118.
(33) (with D. Belleri) “Gettier and context”, in S. Hetherington (ed.) Gettier and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 2018: 78-95..
(34) “Self-knowing interpreters”, in J. Kirsch and P. Pedrini (eds.) Third Person Self-Knowledge, Interpretation and Narrative, Springer, 2018: 13-29.
(35) “How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge”, in A. Coliva and N. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, 2017: 253-284.
(36) "Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein", in A. Contini, E. Moietta, A. Ramploud (eds.) Metamorfosi delle differenze, Roma, Aracne, 2015: 119-147.
(37) “Wittgenstein. Quattro temi dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer”, in D. Generali (ed.) Le radici della razionalità critica: saperi, pratiche, teleologie. Saggi in onore di Fabio Minazzi, Udine, Mimesis, 2015: 86-105.
(38) “Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean skepticism”, in D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014: 248-272.
(39) (with S. Moruzzi) “Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox”, in F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell´Utri (eds.) New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, 2014: 38-62.
(40) (with M. C. Amoretti) “Epistemology”, in T. Andina (ed.) Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide. A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy - Brill Leiden-Boston, 2014: 38-64.
(41) “Scepticism and knowledge”, M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013: 975-1002.
(42) (with M. Palmira) “Relativismo e multiculturalismo”, in C. Baraldi (ed.) Gli invisibili. La condizione degli immigrati nella società, Bonanno, Roma, 2012: 19-39.
(43) (with C. Amoretti) “Epistemologia (o della conoscenza)”, in T. Andina (ed.) Filosofia contemporanea. Uno sguardo globale, Roma, Carocci, 2012: 59-91.
(44) “Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives—is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP, 2012: 323-351.
(45) “One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism”, A. Coliva (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012: 212-242.
(46) “Which key to all mythologies about the self?”, F. Recanati and S. Prosser (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012: 22-45.
(47) (with M. Palmira) “Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein”, in R. Davies (ed.) Analisi, Milano, Mimesis, 2011: 291-304.
(48) “Wittgenstein out of context”, in C. Jaeger, W. Loeffler (eds.) Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 7-13 2011, Kirchberg am Wechsel: 50-51.
(49) “Sull'idea stessa di relativismo”, in V. Villa (ed.) Relativismo: temi e prospettive, Roma, Aracne, 2010: 155-175.
(50) “La verità di Rorty, tra Vattimo e Marconi”, M. Carrara e V. Morato (eds.) Verità, Udine-Milano, Mimesis, 2010: 261-270.
(51) “Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo?”, in Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Rappresentazione, percezione e coscienza, ETS, Pisa, 2009: 95-113.
(52) “What kind of entities are concepts?”, in D. Gambarara, A. Givigliano (eds.) Origine e sviluppo del linguaggio, fra teoria e storia. Atti del XV Convegno della Società di filosofia del linguaggio, Aracne editrice, Roma, 2009: 211-219.
(53) “Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?”, in F. Giuliani e M. Barni (eds.) Il logos nella polis. La diversità delle lingue e delle culture, le nostre identità. Atti del XIV Convegno della Società di Filosofia del linguaggio, Roma, Aracne, 2008: 439-452.
(54) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in A. Coliva (ed.) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, 2007: 255-280.
(55) “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”, in M. De Caro, E. Spinelli (eds.) Lo scetticismo antico e contemporaneo, Carocci, Roma, 2007: 186-210.
(56) “Moore’s paradox and commitments. On this very complicated concept of belief”, in P. Leonardi (ed.) Facets of concepts, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2005: 233-252.
(57) “Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor”, in A. Coliva and E. Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004: 411-429.
(58) “Moore’s Proof of an external world. Just begging the question”, in W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner (eds.) Proceedings Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg XI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2003: 91-96.
(59) “Io pensieri e metafisica dell’io: ovvero dell’anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e analitica”, in M. Carrara, G. De Anna, S. Magrin (eds.) Saggi di filosofia del linguaggio, filosofia della mente e metafisica, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2003: 193-213.
(60) “In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione”, in P. Parrini (a cura di) Conoscenza e cognizione, Guerini, Milano, 2002: 147-161.
(61) “Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Uses of ‘I’ as Subject and as Object at the Origin of the No-Subject View about the Self and its Solution”, in Berit Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality Pre-proceedings of the 24th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2000: 117-122.
(62) “Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo”, in D. Marconi (ed.) Naturalismo e naturalizzazione, Mercurio edizioni, Vercelli, 1999: 169-187.
Reviews
(1) (with E. Mark) A. Byrne Transparency and Self-Knowledge, Mind 130, 2021 pp. 1039–1049.
(2) S. Goldberg Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, on-line first, 2018: 1-6.
(3) M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre De Se Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, Analysis Reviews, 2018: 1-4.
(4) Anna Boncompagni "Wittgenstein and Pragmatism. On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and James", 2016, Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 6/4, 2018.
(5) Duncan Pritchard Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton UP, 2016”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016,
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/68056-epistemic-angst-radical-skepticism-and-the-groundlessness-of-our-believing/
(6) Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans, OUP, 2014”, Analysis, 2015: doi: 10.1093/analysis7anv078
(7) Julia Tanney, Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge, Harvard UP, 2013”, Analysis, 74, 2014, pp. 353-355.
(8) Jordi Fernandez, Transparent Minds, OUP 2013”, Theoria, 81, 2014, pp. 442-445.
(9) G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, CUP, 2013”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.06.33, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40885-personal-identity-complex-or-simple/.
(10) N. Vassallo, Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza, Feltrinelli, 2011”, Iride XXVI/70, 2013, pp. 670-672.
(11) A. Paternoster, Il filosofo e i sensi, Carocci, 2007”, Il Protagora, 12, 2008, pp. 552-554.
(12) Lalumera, E. Normatività e concetti, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004”, 2R, 6, 2007, pp. 12-19.
(13) Vignolo, M. Afferrare pensieri, Carocci, Roma 2001”, Epistemologia, 2004, pp. 356-359.
(14) Paternoster, A. Linguaggio e visione, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2001”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003, pp. 97-99.
(15) Bermúdez, J. L. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, MIT, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 582-586.
(16) Cassam, Q. Self and World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp.654-656.
(17) Wright, C., Smith, B. C., Macdonald, C., (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 586-589.
(18) McDowell, J. Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)- London, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 652-654.
(19) Dionigi, R. La fatica di descrivere. Itinerario di Wittgenstein nel linguaggio della filosofia, Vallecchi editore, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1998, 33, pp. 669-676.
(20) Bruschwig, J., Nussbaum, M. 1996 (eds.) Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge, CUP”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 655-656.
(21) Kim, J. 1996 Philosophy of Mind, Boulder (Colorado)-Oxford, Westview Press”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 608-611.
(22) McGinn, M. 1997 Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London and New York, Routledge”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 583-588.
(23) Stroll, A. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 588-595.
(24) Haldane, J., Wright, C. (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection, New York-Oxford, OUP, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 665-666.
(25) Williams, M. (ed.), Scepticism, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 663-664.
Encyclopedic entries, miscellaneous
(1) "Eva Picardi. Un ricordo", Il Protagora, 44/27-28, 2017, pp. 411-415.
(2) “Self-knowledge”. SAGE Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. by Hal Pashler, 2013.
(3) (with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock) Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographies On-line, 2010, http://oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0127
(4) “La filosofia analitica”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 398-412.
(5) “Wittgenstein”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 419-432.
(6) “Linguaggio e filosofia”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 442-452.
Grants
2025 PI, Humanities Center, grant for the collaborative conference “AI Epistemology” ($3,000). 2025 Humanities Center, grant for the volume Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology, under contract with Oxford University Press ($2,000). 2024 (with A. James and T. Miller), PI, Humanities Center, grant for the collaborative conference “Critical Genealogies” ($2,000). 2023-2025 DECADE Targeted Funds: Summer Camp for Women and Marginalized Groups in Philosophy ($5,000 + $2,000 Equity Advisor, SoH, UCI). 2023 (with Duncan Pritchard), PI, Humanities Center, grant for the collaborative conference “Religious Hinges” ($2,000). 2021 UCI Humanities Center, Collaborative Conference Grant, Conference "Trust, Distrust and Forgiveness" ($3K). 2021 UCI Humanities Center, Grant for the translation of Eva Picardi's Essays for the volume Frege on Language, Logic and Psychology ($2K). 2020 (with A. Boncompagni) UCI Research Center, Grant for Collaborative Conference "Epistemic Injustice and Identities" ($3K). 2020 UCI Humanities 2019 Humanities Commons Grant UCI, for the translation of The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi ($2K). 2019 Humanities Commons Collaborative Conference Grant, "Relativism" conference ($3K).
2018 UCI Campus initiative for confronting extremism (with Duncan Pritchard) grant for a MOOC on “Skepticism and Relativism” ($24,5K).
2018 (with Sven Bernecker) Grant of the Medical Humanities Initiative for the Medical Humanities Speakers Series ($1K). Humanities Commons Grant for collaborative conference 2017 ($1,5K).
UCHRI Grant for Collaborative conference 2017 ($5K). Medical Humanities UCI, Curriculum Development Grant 2017 ($3K). PRIN 2010-2011 "Realismo e oggettività" (period of the grant: 2013-2016). PI of the Research Unit based at UNIMORE ($85K). Grant for "Incentivazione dell´offerta formativa in lingua inglese", Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia (2012, 2013, 2014) ($4K total).
Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship Grant (2006-7), Heidelberg. Italian Academy Research Fellowship Grant (2004), Columbia University, NY). Fulbright Research Scholarship Grant (2002, Columbia University, NY). Italian Government grant for a PhD (1997-2001). Top-up Award, University of St. Andrews (1998, 1999, 2000). SAAS (Scottish Academy Awards) grant for the M. Litt (1997). ERASMUS grant (St. Andrews) (2005-6).
Professional Societies
SIFA (Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy)
SFL (Società di Filosofia del linguaggio)
EEN (European Epistemology Network)
ESAP European Society for Analytic Philosophy
APA (American Philosophical Association)
Other Experience
Member of the Editorial Board
Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy (editor-in-chief), Philosophical Investigations, Sképsis, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Thought, Disputatio, Iride, Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio, Philosophical Inquiries, Rivista italiana filosofia analitica jr, INKOJ-- Philosophy & Artificial Languages, Al-Mukhatabat Journal
Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy (editor-in-chief), Philosophical Investigations, Sképsis, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Thought, Disputatio, Iride, Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio, Philosophical Inquiries, Rivista italiana filosofia analitica jr, INKOJ-- Philosophy & Artificial Languages, Al-Mukhatabat Journal
Research Centers
Deputy Director Research Center in "Knowledge, Technology and Society", SoH, UCI.
Link to this profile
https://faculty.uci.edu/profile/?facultyId=6232
https://faculty.uci.edu/profile/?facultyId=6232
Last updated
01/22/2026
01/22/2026