Duncan Pritchard

picture of Duncan  Pritchard

Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy
School of Humanities

Ph.D., University of St. Andrews, 2000, Philosophy

Email: dhpritch@uci.edu

University of California, Irvine
85 Humanities Instructional Building
Mail Code: 4555
Irvine, CA 92697
Research Interests
Epistemology; Skepticism; Wittgenstein; Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Education; Philosophy of Law
Academic Distinctions
In 2005, Prof Pritchard held a Danish Academy of Sciences/NAMICONA Visiting Research Professorship and was also a Mellon Foundation Visiting Epistemology Fellow at Brown University. In 2007, he was awarded the Philip Leverhulme Prize in Philosophy. In 2009, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of Helsinki. In 2011, he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In 2013, his work was the subject of the Annual Cologne Summer School in Philosophy. In 2013, he delivered the Annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy. In 2016 his work was the subject of the Annual LOGOS Philosophy Masterclass Lectures, University of Barcelona. In 2016 he was invited to be the Tang Chun-I Distinguished Visiting Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong (deferred). Prof Pritchard has so far delivered three Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures.
Professor Pritchard has held Chairs in Philosophy at the Universities of Edinburgh and Stirling, Scotland. He has also held visiting positions at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, Macquarie University, the University of Helskinki, and Aarhus University, Denmark.
Research Abstract
Professor Pritchard's research is mainly in the area of epistemology, and he has published broadly in this field. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, Oxford UP, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012), and Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton UP, 2015).

• Scepticism (with A. Coliva), (Routledge, under contract).
• Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford UP, 2019).
• Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, (Princeton UP, 2015).
• Epistemological Disjunctivism, (Oxford UP, h/bk 2012; p/bk 2014).
• The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, h/bk 2010; p/bk 2012).
• Epistemic Luck, (Oxford UP, h/bk 2005; p/bk 2007).


• What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, (Routledge, 1st ed. 2006; 2nd ed. 2009; 3rd ed. 2013; 4th ed. 2018). [Translated into Arabic & Japanese].
• Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (with M. Harris), (Routledge, 2017).
• Epistemology, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
• What is This Thing Called Philosophy?, (Routledge, 2015).
• Philosophy for Everyone (with M. Chrisman), (Routledge, 2013; 2nd ed. 2016). [Translated into Chinese, Turkish, Portuguese & Spanish].
• Knowledge, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed. 2009; 2nd ed. 2016).
• Epistemology A-Z (with M. Blaauw), (Edinburgh UP/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).


• Brill Studies on Skepticism (with D. Machuca), (Brill, from 2013).
• Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, from 2012).
• New Waves in Philosophy (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, from 2007).


• Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, (Oxford UP, from 2010).
• International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (with D. Machuca), (Brill, from 2011).


• New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (with C. Doyle & J. Milburn), (Routledge, 2019).
• Extended Epistemology, (with A. Clark, J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), (Oxford UP, 2018).
• Socially Extended Epistemology, (with A. Clark, J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), (Oxford UP, 2018).
• The Philosophy of Luck (with L. Whittington), (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).
• Social Epistemology: Five Questions, (with V. F. Hendricks), (Automatic Press, 2015).
• The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (with S. Bernecker), (Routledge, 2010).
• Social Epistemology (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, 2010).
• Epistemic Value (with A. Haddock & A. Millar), (Oxford UP, 2009).
• Williamson on Knowledge (with P. Greenough), (Oxford UP, 2009).
• Arguing About Knowledge (with R. Neta), (Routledge, 2008).
• Epistemology: Five Questions (with V. F. Hendricks), (Automatic Press, 2008).
• New Waves in Epistemology (with V. F. Hendricks), (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
• Moral and Epistemic Virtue (with M. S. Brady), (Blackwell, 2003).


• Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives (with J. Adam Carter, C. Mi & S. O. Palermos), Synthese (forthcoming).
• Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), American Philosophical Quarterly (2016).
• Intellectual Humility (with J. A. Carter & J. Kallestrup), Logos & Episteme (2016).
• The Philosophy of Luck (with L. Whittington), Metaphilosophy 45 (2014).
• Extended Knowledge (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014).
• Extended Cognition and Epistemic Action (with A. Clark & K. Vaesen), Philosophical Explorations 15 (2012).
• Cognitive Ecology: The Role of the Concept of Knowledge in our Social Cognitive Ecology (with M. Gerken, J. Kallestrup & K. Kappel), Episteme 8 (2011).
• The Philosophy of Crispin Wright (with J. Kallestrup), Synthese 171 (2009).
• Epistemic Luck, special issue of Synthese 158 (2007).
• Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology (with M. S. Brady), Philosophical Studies 116 (2006).
• Epistemological Contextualism (with M. S. Brady), Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005).
• Virtues: Moral and Epistemic (with M. S. Brady), Metaphilosophy 34 (2003).


• ‘Ignorance and Inquiry’, American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming).
• ‘Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Commonsense and Philosophy’, Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy, (eds.) R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
• ‘Philosophy in Prisons: Intellectual Virtue and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Teaching Philosophy (forthcoming).
• ‘Extended Entitlement’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Entitlement, (eds.) P. Graham & N. Pedersen, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief’, Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, (eds.) P. Bondy & J. A. Carter, (Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’, Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, (eds.) J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• ‘Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Greco & C. Kelp, (Cambridge UP, forthcoming).
• ‘Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism’, Routledge Handbook to Relativism, (ed.) M. Kusch, (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (ed.) J. Dutant, (Oxford UP, forthcoming).
• ‘Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, (Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, (eds.) C. Pavese & E. Fridland, (Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Précis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Skepsis (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing).
• ‘Putnam on Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion-Sensitive Semantics’, Engaging Putnam, (eds.) J. Conant & S. Chakraborty, (Harvard UP, forthcoming).
• ‘Educating For Intellectual Humility and Conviction’, Teaching and Learning, (ed.) D. Bakhurst, (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action’, Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, (eds.) N. de Costa & S. Wuppuluri, (Springer, forthcoming).
• ‘Extended Cognition and Humility’, Routledge Handbook on Humility, (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, (Routledge, forthcoming).
• ‘Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo’, (Symposium on Venturinha’s Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology), Philosophia (forthcoming).

• ‘Cognitive Achievement and Environmental Luck: An Empirical Study’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Shepherd), Review of Philosophy and Psychology, (forthcoming). [Online First (2019), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9].
• ‘The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement’ (with J. A. Carter), Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 44 (2019), 220-42.
• ‘Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection’, Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, (ed.) W. Da Silva Filho, chapter 5, (Springer, 2019).
• ‘Scepticism and Atheism’, A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, (ed.) G. Oppy, 277-90, (Blackwell, 2019).
• ‘Modal Accounts of Luck’, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, (eds.) I. Church & R. Hartman, ch. 10, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘Extended Self-Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, (eds.) J. E. Kirsch & P. Pedrini, 31-49, (Springer, 2019).
• ‘Contemporary Responses to Radical Scepticism’, Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945 to 2015, (eds.) K. Becker & I. Thomson, (Cambridge UP, 2019).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) H. Battaly, ch. 23, (Routledge, 2019).
• ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History—Vol IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) S. Hetherington & M. Valaris, ch. 11, (Bloomsbury, 2019).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (eds.) C. Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, 41-58, (Routledge, 2019).

• ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018), 70-90. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas].
• ‘Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement’, Synthese. [Online First (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5]
• ‘Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement’, TOPOI. [Online First (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y]
• ‘Unnatural Doubts’, Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, (eds.) G. A. Bruno & A. Rutherford, 223-47, (Routledge 2018).
• ‘Extended Virtue Epistemology’, Inquiry 61 (2018), 632-47.
• ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence 9 (2018), 108-19. [To be reprinted in Law and Virtues, (eds.) A. Amaya & C. Michelon, (Routledge, forthcoming)].
• ‘Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education’, Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), 328-49; and to be reprinted in Connecting Virtues: Theoretical and Educational Insights, (eds.) M. Croce & M. S. Vaccarezza, (Blackwell, forthcoming).
• ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2018), 51-66.
• ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, (ed.) C. Johnson, 22-39, (Routledge, 2018).
• ‘Extended Knowledge’, Extended Epistemology, (eds.) J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & D. H. Pritchard, 90-104, (Oxford UP, 2018).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism’, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, (ed.) V. Mitova, 15-31, (Cambridge UP, 2018). [Translated into Portugese by E. Carvalho, and published in Sképsis].
• ‘The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck’, The Gettier Problem, (ed.) S. Hetherington, 96-107, (Cambridge UP, 2018).
• ‘Precis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemic Angst with R. Borges, M. Veder & C. Salvatore), 41 (2018), 115-65.
• ‘Aesthetic Risk’, Think 17 (2018), 1-14.
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2018); [available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/].

• ‘Anti-Risk Epistemology and Negative Epistemic Dependence’, Synthese. [Online First (2017), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6]
• ‘Faith and Reason’, Philosophy (invited special issue on Religious Epistemology), 81 (2017), 101-18.
• ‘Epistemically Useful False Beliefs’, Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017), 4-20.
• ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’ (with C. Ranalli), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, 652-67, (Bloomsbury, 2017).
• ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity’ (with J. A. Carter), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, (eds.) K. McCain & T. Poston, 133-48, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge-First Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge-First Epistemology, (eds.) J. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, 200-22, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, (eds.) H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 563-75, (Blackwell, 2017).
• ‘Knowledge, Luck and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem’, Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on The Gettier Problem, (eds.) C. Almeida, P. Klein & R. Borges, 57-73, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Situationism, (eds.) M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168-91, (Oxford UP, 2017).
• ‘Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding’ (with J. A. Carter), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, (eds.) S. Ammon, C. Baumberger, C. Beisbart, G. Brun & S. Grimm, 272-92, (Routledge, 2017).
• ‘Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value’, Synthese 194 (2017), 1477–86.
• ‘Intellectual Pride and Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pride, (eds.) J. A. Carter & E. Gordon, 69-78, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
• ‘Is There a Fundamental Tension Between Faith and Rationality?’, Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 53-61, (Routledge, 2017).
• ‘How Do Scientific Claims Relate to the Truth?’ (with S. O Palermos), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, 4-15, (Routledge, 2017).

• ‘Epistemic Risk’, Journal of Philosophy 113 (2016), 550-71.
• ‘Epistemic Angst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2016), DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12280. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas].
• ‘Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 969-90.
• ‘Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy’, Episteme 13 (2016), 29-42.
• ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016), 1-20.
• ‘Contextualism and Radical Scepticism’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0.
• ‘Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification’ (with P. Bondy), Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2.
• ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat’, Synthese (2016), DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4.
• ‘Epistemic Axiology’, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, (eds.) M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig, 407-22, (DeGruyter, 2016).
• ‘The Distribution of Epistemic Agency’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency, (ed.) P. Reider, 109-26, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
• ‘From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Res Philosophica 93 (2016), 533-52.
• ‘Ignorance and Epistemic Value’, The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, (eds.) M. Blaauw & R. Peels, 132-43, (Cambridge UP, 2016).
• ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Baehr, 113-27, (Routledge, 2016).
• ‘Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, (ed.) M. Fernandez, 31-50, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘Radical Scepticism and Brains in Vats’ (with C. Ranalli), The Brain in a Vat, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 75-89, (Cambridge UP, 2016).
• ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, 205-23, (Oxford UP, 2016).
• ‘Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement’ (with J. A. Carter), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue, (eds.) M. Slote, E. Sosa & C. Mi, 49-63, (Routledge, 2016).
• ‘The Sources of Scepticism’, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (invited special issue on Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein), 6 (2016), 203-27.
• ‘Veritism and Epistemic Value’, Alvin Goldman and His Critics, (eds.) H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin, 200-18, (Blackwell, 2016).
• ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue’, Zi Ran Bian Zheng Fa Tong Xun [Journal of Dialectics of Nature] (commissioned), (2016).

• ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 93-111.
• ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), 436-61.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck’ (with J. A. Carter), Noûs 49 (2015), 440-53.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015), 181-99.
• ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value’ (with J. A. Carter), Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2015), 799-816.
• ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Responses to My Critics’, Analysis (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism), 75 (2015), 589-95 & 627-37.
• ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman’, God, Truth and Other Enigmas, (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, (Walter de Gruyter, 2015).
• ‘Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie’, Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, 153-78, (Mentis, 2015).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’ (with J. Kallestrup), European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), 335-57.
• ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45 (2014), 594-619; and reprinted in The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, 143-68, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).

• ‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 63-109.
• ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, (Springer, 2014).
• ‘Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion’, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, (eds.) C. Littlejohn & J. Turri, 155-72, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Sceptical Intuitions’, Intuitions, (eds.) D. Rowbottom & T. Booth, 213-31, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini, 190-213, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good’, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, (eds.) J. Matheson & R. Vitz, 112-29, (Oxford UP, 2014).
• ‘Re-evaluating the Epistemic Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology’, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, (eds.) A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, 143-54, (Cambridge UP, 2014).
• ‘What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview’, (with M. Massimi), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, (ed.) M. Massimi, 1-13, (Routledge, 2014).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture (invited submission), 478 (2014), 47-66.
• ‘Zagzebski on Rationality’ (with S. Ryan), European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 39-46.

• ‘The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, (eds.) J. Greco & R. Groff, ch. 13, (Routledge, 2013).
• ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, (eds.) T. Henning & D. Schweikard, 209-226, (Routledge, 2013).
• ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2013), 236-47; reprinted in Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives From Social and Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) B. Kotzee, 92-105, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology’ (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology (2013).
• ‘Davidson on Radical Skepticism’, Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, 521-33, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Ed.), (eds.) M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, 152-64, (Blackwell, 2013).
• ‘Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Humanities (invited submission for special issue on Richard Rorty), 2 (2013), 351-68.
• ‘Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Value’ (invited submission), Philosophical Inquiries 1 (2013), 1-37.
• ‘Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo’ (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41 (2013), 27-35.

• ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012), 247-79; reprinted in Epistemology: Major Works, (ed.) R. Neta, (Routledge, 2013); translated by G. Gaboardy into Portugese for Intuitio 9 (2016), 148-181.
• ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012), 84-103.
• ‘Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing’, Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. [To be translated and published in Portugese, by J. do Carmo].
• ‘In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.) T. Black & K. Becker, 173-92, (Cambridge UP, 2012).
• ‘On Meta-Epistemology’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (2012), 91-108.
• ‘Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments’, Disagreement and Skepticism, (ed.) D. Machuca, 150-68, (Routledge, 2012).
• ‘Hume on Miracles’ (with A. Richmond), The Continuum Companion to Hume, (eds.) A. Bailey & D. O’Brien, 227-45, (Continuum, 2012).
• ‘Two Conceptions of Radical Scepticism’, Ámbitos (invited submission for special issue on Radical Scepticism), 28 (2012), 13-20.

• ‘Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism’, Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed.) D. Machuca, 193-202, (Springer 2011).
• ‘Wittgenstein on Scepticism’, The Oxford Handbook on Wittgenstein, (eds.) O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, 521-47, (Oxford UP, 2011).
• ‘What is the Swamping Problem?’, Reasons for Belief, (eds.) A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen, 244-59, (Cambridge UP, 2011).
• ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem’, Philosophical Issues 21 (2011), 434-55.
• ‘The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Der Begriff des Wissens/Conceptions of Knowledge, (ed.) S. Tolksdorf, 159-78, (de Gruyter, 2011).
• ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59.
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2011).
• ‘Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism’, Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. Dougherty, 362-92, (Oxford UP, 2011).
• ‘Skepticism and Information’ (with E. T. Kerr), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology, (ed.) H. Demir, (Springer, 2011).

• ‘Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination’, Noûs 44 (2010), 245-68.
• ‘Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis’, Synthese 175 (2010), 133-51.
• ‘Absurdity, Angst and The Meaning of Life’, Monist (2010) 93, 3-16.
• ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, (Blackwell, 2010).
• ‘Achievements, Luck and Value’, Think 25 (2010), 1-12.

• ‘Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism’, Synthese 171 (2009), 467-79.
• ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, 19-43, (Cambridge UP, 2009).
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Harvard Review of Philosophy (2009) 16, 2-19.
• ‘Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning’ (with C. Kelp), All Truths Are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, (ed.) J. Salerno, 324-38, (Oxford UP, 2009).
• ‘Defusing Epistemic Relativism’, Synthese 166 (2009), 397-412.
• ‘Apt Performance and Epistemic Value’, Philosophical Studies (2009) 143, 407-16.
• ‘Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?’, Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009), 33-45.
• ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, Analysis 69 (2009), 317-25.
• ‘Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17, 589-96.
• ‘Knowledge’, Central Issues of Philosophy, (ed.) J. Shand, 24-36, (Blackwell, 2009).
• ‘Radical Scepticism and Epistemic Value’, Iris (special issue on Contemporary Anti-Scepticism) 1 (2009), 419-28.

• ‘Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements’, Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 437-47.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’, Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82 (2008), 19-41.
• ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford UP, 2008).
• ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology’, The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.) J. Greco, 437-55, (Oxford UP, 2008).
• ‘Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008), 325-39.
• ‘Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism’, Social Epistemology 22 (2008), 305-23.
• ‘Certainty and Scepticism’, Philosophical Issues 18 (2008), 58-67.
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited’, Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 66-88.
• ‘A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophica 78 (2008), 13-28.

• ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius’ (with R. Neta), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 381-96.
• ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 158 (2007), 277-97.
• ‘How to be a Neo-Moorean’, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 68-99, (Oxford UP, 2007).
• ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 85-110.
• ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries’, New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) V. F. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard, 28-51, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
• ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (2007).

• ‘Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck’, Philosophical Studies 116 (2006), 135-45.
• ‘Moral and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 1-25.

• ‘Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206.
• ‘The Structure of Sceptical Arguments’, Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52.
• ‘Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manœuvres’, Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, 85-104, (MIT Press, 2005).
• ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’, Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, 189-224, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge’, Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43.
• ‘Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien (special issue on Contextualism) 67 (2005), 20-43.
• ‘Greco on Scepticism’ (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84.
• ‘Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism’, Acta Analytica 20 (2005), 3-25.

• ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), 326-48. [Translated into Portuguese].
• ‘Epistemic Luck’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004), 193-222.
• ‘Epistemic Deflationism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), 103-34.
• ‘The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck’ (with M. Smith), New Ideas in Psychology 22 (2004), 1-28.
• ‘Testimony’, The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, 101-20, (Hart, 2004).
• ‘An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism’ (with J. Kallestrup), Philosophia 31 (2004), 345-54.
• ‘Some Recent Work in Epistemology’, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 604-13.

• ‘McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism’, European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003), 273-94.
• ‘Reforming Reformed Epistemology’, International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66; and reprinted in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, (eds.) R. Rood, S. Roeser & R. van Woudenberg, 177-210, (Rodopi, 2005).
• ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 106-30; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 210-34, (Blackwell, 2003).

• ‘Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57.
• ‘McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments’, Synthese 130 (2002), 279-302.
• ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 283-307.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure’, Theoria 69 (2002), 129-61.
• ‘Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002), 19-55.
• ‘Skepticism, Contemporary’, Internet Encyclopædia of Philosophy (2002).

• ‘Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent’, Dialectica 55 (2001), 327-49.
• ‘Scepticism and Dreaming’, Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90.
• ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and “Hinge” Propositions’, Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, 97-122, (Peter Lang, 2001).

• ‘Closure and Context’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80.
• ‘Is “God Exists” a “Hinge” Proposition of Religious Belief?’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40.
• ‘Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the ‘Metaepistemological’ Challenge’, Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214.
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